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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the decades following the Civil War, the American legal profession 
engaged in a heated debate about the wisdom of replacing the substantive 
common law with a written civil code.  During the dispute’s most intense 
period, in the 1880s, discussions of the benefits and shortcomings of 
codification appeared regularly in legal publications, as well as in general-
interest newspapers and magazines.  Professional organizations and state 
legislatures devoted countless hours to the question.  Ultimately, the 
postbellum codification movement achieved little.  David Dudley Field’s 
tireless efforts to persuade New York State to enact the Civil Code he drafted 
came tantalizingly close to fruition, but finally failed.  California embraced a 
revised version Field’s Civil Code in 1872, but the courts of that state soon 
adopted a mode of code interpretation that rendered their approach to legal 
decision making little different from that of courts in common law states.  By 
the 1890s, it was apparent that the American defenders of the common law had 
won the battle.  The codification impulse lasted into the twentieth century, as 
reflected in the Uniform Code and Restatement projects.  But there were no 
further major campaigns to abandon the common law wholesale in favor of a 
code.1
The late nineteenth-century codification debate generated a profusion of 
jurisprudential literature.  Although modern scholars have not totally ignored 
this rich body of writing,2 they have devoted surprisingly little attention to it.  
Strikingly, only a few articles have analyzed the portrait of the common law 
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1 See infra pp. [  ]. 
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painted by Gilded Age jurists who fought codification.3 This neglect is 
surprising, for the common law jurisprudence of that period has engaged the 
attention of legal scholars for more than a century.  The writings of those who 
resisted the common law’s elimination are an obvious source of insight into 
the era’s conception of the common law.   
Importantly, much anticodification literature described the common law in 
a manner greatly different from what standard twentieth-century depictions of 
Gilded Age private law jurisprudence would lead one to expect.  Legal 
scholars have long viewed Christopher Columbus Langdell, the Dean of 
Harvard Law School from 1870 to 1895, as the prototypical American jurist of 
the late nineteenth century.  He portrayed the common law as a conceptually-
ordered scientific system in which rigorous logical reasoning trumped 
concerns about the just resolution of particular cases.  In “Langdell’s 
Orthodoxy,” probably the most influential modern article on Langdell, 
Thomas Grey dubbed this system of legal thought “classical orthodoxy.”4
Others have labeled it “mechanical jurisprudence,”5 “classical legal thought,”6
“liberal legal science,”7 or “Langdellian formalism.”8 Whatever term they 
have preferred, scholars have long agreed that Gilded Age legal thinkers 
viewed the common law as a rigidly logical, amoral system. 
In recent years, some have begun to challenge the notion that soulless 
formalism typified Gilded Age common law jurisprudence.9 Stephen Siegel, 
for example, has successfully demonstrated that Langdell’s supposed 
amorality was not characteristic of late nineteenth-century legal thought.  He 
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LAW & HIST. REV. 215 (1995) [hereinafter Siegel, Joel Bishops’s Orthodoxy]; Francis 
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LEGAL HIST. 422 (2004) [hereinafter Siegel, Francis Wharton’s Orthodoxy]; Stephen A. 
Siegel, John Chipman Gray and the Moral Basis of Classical Legal Thought, 86 IOWA L. 
REV. 1513 (2001) [hereinafter Siegel, John Chipman Gray]; Bruce Kimball, Langdell on 
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REV. (forthcoming 2007) (production draft obtained from journal editor-in-chief).  
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has closely analyzed the work of other leading jurists of the era, both religious 
scholars such as Joel Bishop and Francis Wharton and secular scholars such as 
John Chipman Gray, and has shown that they believed the common law had a 
moral basis.10 Nevertheless, Siegel retains the label classical in describing 
these men because, like Langdell, they firmly embraced the common law’s 
formal conceptual order.  Indeed, Siegel’s central thesis is that moral 
classicism was the standard jurisprudential approach of the late nineteenth 
century.  Strikingly, one scholar has recently contended that even Langdell 
himself was not “Langdellian,” as that term has long been understood. 11 
Bruce Kimball challenges the familiar portrait of Langdell as an amoral 
logician.  Instead, he depicts Langdell as a flexible thinker concerned with 
justice and policy.  Kimball does not, however, deny that Langdell was 
classicist, but only that he was an amoral one.12
The anticodification literature explored in this article powerfully supports 
the rising consensus among revisionist legal historians that Gilded Age jurists 
generally viewed morality as an essential component of the common law.  
Indeed, the anticodifiers argued that the common law’s ethical content was one 
of its main advantages over a code system.  This article goes further than the 
current revisionist scholarship, however, by suggesting that at least some late-
nineteenth century jurists so devalued formal conceptual order, at least when it 
came into conflict with case-specific justice, that they can hardly be 
characterized as “classical” at all.  The anticodifiers, most notably James 
Coolidge Carter, their leading intellectual voice, explicitly minimized the role 
of formality and conceptual order in common law decision making.  This 
article will explore how the battle against codification drove Carter and others 
to formulate a common law method that largely rejected the formal and 
conceptual aspects of legal reasoning that dominated Langdell’s system.13 
Indeed, in trumpeting the advantages of the common law, Carter, an almost 
exact contemporary of Langdell,14 manifested a rule skepticism that 
foreshadowed that of the legal realists a half century later.   
Can a legal system be both classical and moral?  Siegel argues not only that 
such a combination is possible, but that it epitomized Gilded Age 
jurisprudence.  He fails, however, to acknowledge that there is, at bottom, an 
unavoidable tension between classicism and justice, between formal 
 
10 Siegel, Joel Bishops’s Orthodoxy, supra note 9; Siegel, Francis Wharton’s 
Orthodoxy, supra note 9; Siegel, John Chipman Gray, supra note 9. 
11  Bruce A. Kimball, “Warn Students that I Entertain Heretical Opinions, Which They 
Are Not to Take as Law”: The Inception of Case Method Teaching in the Classroom of 
Early C. C. Langdell, 1870-1883, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 57 (1999); Bruce A. Kimball, The 
Langdell Problem: Historicizing the Century of Historiography, 1906-2000s, 22 LAW &
HIST. REV. 277 (2004) [hereinafter Kimball, The Langdell Problem]; Kimball, supra note 9.  
12 See infra p. [  ]. 
13  Andrew Morriss, interestingly, reads Carter and reaches the opposite conclusion.  
Morriss, supra note 2 at 389 (describing the anticodifiers as having “a shared sense of the 
common law as a system of rules that, at least, is striving toward internal consistency . . .”) 
14 Langdell lived from 1826 to 1906.  Carter lived from 1827 to 1905. 
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conceptual order and equity.  Morality undoubtedly shaped the classical legal 
system’s general principles, and it may have helped guide the reasoning 
process by which legal scientists derived lower-level rules from these general 
principles.  Nevertheless, a jurist applying lower-level rules to actual affairs 
simply has to choose occasionally between the deductive application of a rule 
and the equitable resolution of a particular case.  Carter and Langdell both 
recognized this phenomenon, but they diverged on the appropriate solution.  
When forced to choose between formal deductive reasoning and a fair 
outcome, Langdell favored the former whereas Carter opted for the latter.   
 
II. THE BATTLE OVER THE CIVIL CODE: FIELD VERSUS CARTER 
A.  The Codification Movement 
David Dudley Field made his first major foray into the world of 
codification in 1847, when he assumed membership on a New York State 
commission created, pursuant to the state’s 1846 constitution, “to revise, 
reform, simplify, and abridge the rules and practice, pleadings, forms and 
proceedings of the courts of record of this State.”15 This three-man 
commission produced a Code of Civil Procedure, which New York enacted in 
1848.16 Field so dominated the drafting of this instrument that it became 
commonly known as “the Field Code.”17 It abolished the complex scheme of 
common law writ pleading, as well as the independent system of equity 
procedure, and replaced both with a simplified, uniform procedural system.18 
The procedural code was Field’s most successful codification effort; the 
majority of states ultimately embraced the Field Code or some revised version 
 
15 FRIEDMAN, supra note 2 at 391 (quoting N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 24 (1847)).  See id. at 
391 (describing the formation of the commission and Field’s participation on it). 
16 In 1849, this commission also completed a Code of Criminal Procedure, which New 
York finally enacted in 1881.   
17 Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of 
an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311, 317 (1988). 
18 At least on the surface, code procedure, with its single form of action, fact pleading, 
joinder, and discovery, borrowed more from equity than from the common law.  Subrin, 
supra note 17, at 337.  Subrin, however, contends that despite the indisputable 
commonalities between the Field Code and equity practice, “Field . . . leaned as much, or 
more, toward the view of common law procedure, as to equity.”  Stephen N. Subrin, How 
Equity Conquered the Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical 
Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 939 (1987).  According to Subrin, Field rejected the 
flexibility and judicial discretion of equity, because he wanted the legal system to be 
efficient and predictable.  He thus designed a procedure that was, despite its surface 
similarities to equity procedure, more confining and formalistic.  Id. at 934-36; Subrin, 
supra note 17, at 327-34.    
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of it.19 Moreover, the code eventually served, in some important ways, as a 
model for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, enacted in 1938.20 
Even after 1848, however, the substantive private law of New York—its 
law of torts, contracts, property, domestic relations, wills, and agency, for 
example—remained mostly uncodified.  Lawyers and judges had to extract 
these rules from countless reported judicial decisions and some poorly 
organized statutes.  New York was hardly alone in this respect; despite the 
efforts of many fervent and eloquent codification proponents in antebellum 
America,21 substantive private law development was still court-centered 
throughout the country at the time of the Civil War.  In other words, the 
United States remained, from a substantive rather than a procedural 
perspective, almost uniformly a common law country.22 
In addition to mandating procedural reform, New York’s 1846 constitution 
also required the establishment of a commission “to reduce into a written and 
systematic code the whole body of the law of this state, or so much and such 
parts thereof as to the said commissioners shall seem practicable and 
expedient.”23 The first such commission failed to produce a code, but in 1857 
the legislature established a new code commission and named David Dudley 
Field one of its three members.  Field was primarily responsible for writing the 
resulting substantive Civil Code.24 
The commission presented the final draft of the Civil Code to the 
legislature in 1865.  In the introduction to the code, Field described it as a 
“complete digest of our existing law, common and statute, dissected and 
analyzed, avoiding repetitions and rejecting contradictions, moulded into 
distinct propositions, and arranged in scientific order, with proper 
amendments, and in this form sanctioned by the Legislature . . . .”25 Field also 
explained what benefits codification offered: 
 
19 Charles E. Clark, Code Pleading and Practice Today, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD:
CENTENARY ESSAYS CELEBRATING ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF LEGAL REFORM 55 (Alison 
Reppy ed.) (1949). 
20 See id. at 64 (“[T]here can be no question but that [the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure] represent a present-day interpretation and execution of what are at bottom the 
Field principles.”)   
21 See generally, COOK, supra note 2. 
22 Louisiana was the major exception.  Essentially a civil law state, it enacted, in 1825, 
a general, substantive Civil Code, drafted by Edward Livingston.  FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, 
at 173-74, 403.  In 1860, Georgia became the first common law state to enact a civil code.  
Id. at 405-06; Gunther A. Weiss, The Enchantment of Codification in the Common Law 
World, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 435, 511-12 (2000). 
23 Morriss, supra note 2 (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 17 (1847)). 
24 Daun van Ee, David Dudley Field and the Reconstruction of the Law 49 (1974) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University). 
25 Introduction, THE CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK xv (Albany, Weed, 
Parsons 1865) [hereinafter Introduction, CIVIL CODE].  
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In the first place, it will enable the lawyer to dispense with a great number of 
books which now incumber [sic] the shelves of his library.  In the next place, it 
will thus save a vast amount of labor, now forced upon lawyers and judges, in 
searching through the reports, examining and collecting cases, and drawing 
inferences from decisions . . . .  In the third place, it will afford an opportunity 
for settling, by legislative enactment, many disputed questions, which the 
courts have never been able to settle.  In the fourth place, it will enable the 
Legislature to effect reforms in different branches of the law, which can only 
be effected by simultaneous and comprehensive legislation. . . .  In the fifth 
place, a publication of a Code will diffuse among the people a more general 
and accurate knowledge of their rights and duties, than can be obtained in any 
other manner.26 
Despite Field’s references to the Civil Code’s substantive reforms and 
resolution of disputed questions, his primary goal in drafting the code was not 
to revolutionize the content of New York’s law, but rather to embody existing 
law in an organized statutory form.  In his view, the only significant reforms 
contained in the code concerned the rights of married women, the adoption of 
children, and the assimilation of the law of real property and personal 
property.  By Field’s own count, there were only about 120 other changes, all 
“of less importance,” in the code’s 1,998 sections.27 
Field spent many years doggedly urging the adoption of his Civil Code.  
Both the Assembly and the Senate of New York voted to enact the Civil Code 
in 1879 and 1882, but each time the governor vetoed it.  Undaunted, Field 
lobbied for the passage of the Civil Code annually throughout the 1880s.28 
Nonetheless, it never became part of New York law.  Field’s successes in the 
area of substantive codification were confined to a few western states.  The 
Dakota Territory enacted his Civil Code with almost no changes in 1865, and 
both North and South Dakota continued to use it when they became states in 
1889.29 Montana enacted a revised version of the code in 1895.30 Field’s 
greatest triumph occurred in 1872, when California adopted a modified 
version of his Civil Code.31 As will be discussed below, however, the state’s 
judiciary soon minimized the significance of this event by embracing a method 
 
26 Introduction, CIVIL CODE, supra note 26, at xxix-xxx. 
27 Id. at xxx-xxxi. 
28 Alison Reppy, The Field Codification Concept, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD:
CENTENARY ESSAYS CELEBRATING ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF LEGAL REFORM 36-42 (Alison 
Reppy ed.) (1949); van Eee, supra note 24, at 331-32.  This later code commission drafted 
not only the substantive Civil Code, but also a Political Code (1860) and a Penal Code 
(1865).  The New York legislature never enacted the former, but it enacted the latter in 
1881.   
29 Weiss, supra note 22, at 512. 
30 Id. at 513.  Both California and Montana enacted versions of four of the codes Field 
drafted for New York; the code of civil procedure, the civil code, the political code, and the 
penal code.  Id. at 512-13.   
31 Grossman, supra note 2. 
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of code interpretation that rendered California’s approach to legal decision 
making little different from that of the traditional common law states.32 
B.  The Anticodification Response 
 
Field’s codification campaign failed in New York State largely because of 
the energy, passion, and talent of the opponents of codification there.  The 
leader of this opposition was James Coolidge Carter, an extremely prominent 
legal figure in the late nineteenth-century—perhaps the most famous lawyer of 
his era.33 As I have discussed elsewhere, Carter was one of the nation’s 
leading appellate advocates, and he argued some of the most important 
Supreme Court cases of the Gilded Age.34 President Grover Cleveland likely 
would have appointed him Chief Justice of the United States if not for 
concerns about his health.35 Carter was also an influential figure in New York 
City politics and one of the country’s foremost municipal reformers.36 In 
addition, he served as president of the American Bar Association, the New 
York State Bar Association, and the Association of the Bar of the City of New 
York (ABCNY).   
From within the last of these organizations, Carter led the successful fight 
against Field’s efforts to replace New York State’s decisional private law with 
a civil code.  Under Carter’s direction, ABCNY attorneys issued a series of 
pamphlets excoriating the code for failing to reflect the actual state of the 
common law in particular substantive areas, even when it was intended to do 
so.  In some instances, these pamphlets suggested that Field had manipulated 
the law to favor his plutocratic clients.37 Carter assigned himself (and Albert 
 
32 Infra pp. [   ]. 
33 See GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS; THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE 
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 173 (1970); James Grafton Rogers, 
AMERICAN BAR LEADERS: BIOGRAPHIES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, 1878-1928, at 80-85 (1932).  For detailed discussions of Carter’s career, see 
Grossman, supra note 3, and Lewis A. Grossman, The Ideal and the Actual of James 
Coolidge Carter: Morality and Law in the Gilded Age 389-97 (2005) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Yale University) (on file with author). 
34 Among the prominent cases Carter argued were The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 
U.S. 581 (1889), U.S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290 (1896), U.S. v. 
Joint Traffic Association, 171 U.S. 505 (1897), Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898), and 
Hyde v. Continental Trust Co., 157 U.S. 654 (1895) (companion case to Pollock v. 
Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895)). 
35 See THERON G. STRONG, LANDMARKS OF A LAWYER’S LIFETIME 281 (1914); GEORGE 
MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS; THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE 
BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 173 (1970); James Coolidge Carter 9 (unattributed speech 
in the Irving Club Collection, Special Collections, Hoskins Library, Univ. of Tennessee 
Knoxville). See also The Man for Chief Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1888.  
36 Grossman, supra note 3, at 579-80. 
37 Id. at 588-89. 
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Mathews, whose work is also discussed below38) the task of framing the 
broader jurisprudential and practical arguments against codification and in 
favor of the common law.  He did so in two major pamphlets, titled The 
Proposed Codification of Our Common Law and The Provinces of the Written 
and the Unwritten Law, and in testimony before the New York Senate.39 
During the 1880s, Carter’s name became almost synonymous with the 
anticodification position. 
Carter set forth a detailed portrait of the common law in these anticode 
polemics, in a renowned 1890 presidential address to the American Bar 
Association called The Ideal and the Actual in the Law, and in a posthumously 
published book titled Law: Its Origin, Growth, and Function.40 Through these 
writings, he became the most prominent representative of the American school 
of historical jurisprudence.  Like Friedrich Karl von Savigny, the leader of the 
German historical school, Carter equated the unwritten law with the evolving 
customs of the people.  He argued that common law judges, instead of making 
law, found the basis for their decisions in “the social standard of justice, or 
from the habits and customs from which that standard itself has been 
derived.”41 Statutory enactments, by contrast, often conflicted with custom, or 
came to do so as custom changed while the written law remained static.  In 
Carter’s view, legislation contrary to custom was not only futile, but promoted 
grave mischief as the people strove to evade its enforcement.  He thus 
contended that the regulation of private affairs should remain primarily the 
province of the unwritten law.42 
By equating the common law with custom, Carter acknowledged that the 
law would change along with the habits and manners of the people.  
Nonetheless, Carter clung to a form of moral objectivism even while 
recognizing social flux.  His simultaneous embrace of natural law notions and 
historical evolutionism represented a coherent, if not always clearly expressed, 
melding of the two approaches.43 Carter believed that the evolution of custom 
was characterized by the gradual unfolding of eternal moral principles.  
Therefore, the common law, by reflecting customary standards of justice, 
embodied elements of natural law.  As Carter explained, “[The law] possesses 
 
38 See infra p. [ ]. 
39 JAMES COOLIDGE CARTER, THE PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF OUR COMMON LAW 
(1884) [hereinafter CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION]; JAMES COOLIDGE CARTER, THE 
PROVINCES OF THE WRITTEN AND THE UNWRITTEN LAW (1889) [hereinafter CARTER,
PROVINCES];  JAMES COOLIDGE CARTER, ARGUMENT OF JAMES C. CARTER IN OPPOSITION TO 
THE BILL TO ESTABLISH A CIVIL CODE BEFORE THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE (1887) 
[hereinafter CARTER, ARGUMENT]. 
40 James Coolidge Carter, The Ideal and the Actual in the Law, in REP. THIRTEENTH 
ANN. MEETING A.B.A. 225 (1890) [hereinafter Carter, Ideal and Actual]; JAMES COOLIDGE 
CARTER, LAW: ITS ORIGIN, GROWTH, AND FUNCTION (1907) [hereinafter CARTER, ORIGIN,
GROWTH & FUNCTION] .
41 Carter, Ideal and Actual, supra note 40, at 228. 
42 Grossman, supra note 3, at 602-19. 
43 Id. at 606-09. 
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as an essential feature a moral character; . . . it springs from and reposes upon 
that everlasting and infinite Justice which is one of the attributes of Divinity; 
and . . . it is so much of that attribute as each particular society is able to 
comprehend and willing to apply to human affairs.”44 Because Anglo-
American civilization was highly advanced, its customs, and hence its law, 
were approaching the ideal.45 Carter asserted, “I have sought to discover those 
rules only which actually regulate conduct, not those which ought to regulate 
it.” Tellingly, however, he then remarked, “I imagine that the rule which will 
be found in fact to exist, is the best.”46 
Carter’s reference to “finding” a legal rule points to another essential 
aspect of his jurisprudence.  He steadfastly denied that judges “made” law.  
Rather, they “declared” already existing law, which they “found” among the 
“habits, customs, business and manners of the people, and those previously 
declared rules which have sprung out of previous similar inquiries into habits, 
customs, business and manners.”47 This assertion was a critical feature of 
Carter’s defense of the common law against the codifiers’ attacks.  Advocates 
of codification often protested that judges did not “find” the unwritten law, but 
rather “made” it themselves.  Field, for example, argued: “[T]he legislative 
and judicial departments should be kept distinct. . . .  [W]e violate [this 
maxim] every hour that we allow judges to participate in the making of the 
laws.”48 In response, Carter maintained that custom was an objective, 
nondiscretionary basis for judicial decisions.    
Proponents of codification also frequently condemned the common law’s 
ex post facto quality.  Because the common law was inaccessible to 
nonlawyers, they argued, citizens were not aware of their legal obligations 
until a judge issued his decision.  A code, by contrast, would allow any person 
to determine his duties and responsibilities before taking action.  David 
Dudley Field declared, “[T]hat only is truly law which has been provided 
beforehand.”49 In response, Carter contended that it was fair to presume that 
people were familiar with common law rules, because the common law was 
based on custom, and “[t]he term [custom] itself imports that it is known to 
all.” He explained: “A man can hardly live in society without knowing how 
 
44 CARTER, PROVINCES, supra note 39, at 13. 
45 Stephen Siegel has identified a parallel impulse among other legal thinkers of the 
time.  Stephen A. Siegel, Historism in Late Nineteenth-Century Constitutional Thought,
1990 WIS. L. REV. 1431, 1438. 
46 CARTER, ORIGIN, GROWTH & FUNCTION, supra note 40, at 145.  
47 Carter, Ideal and Actual, supra note 40, at 224.  He often asserted that judges were 
society’s “experts” at ascertaining these customs, although he never offered any real 
support for this assertion.  See, e.g., CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 39, at 1; 
CARTER, PROVINCES, supra note 39, at 11; CARTER, ORIGIN, GROWTH & FUNCTION, supra 
note 40, at 327. 
48 David Dudley Field, Codification, 20 AM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1886). 
49 David Dudley Field, Codification, An Address Delivered before the Law Academy of 
Philadelphia 22 (1886). 
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men act—that is, what custom is. . . .  Custom is of all things the one most 
universally known.”50 
Carter’s contention that judges and citizens in a common law system could 
determine the single, correct resolution to any legal question depended on the 
uniformity of custom.  If Carter had conceded the existence of multiple, 
competing customs, he also would have had to acknowledge that judges 
simply selected which custom to follow, and therefore that a citizen could not 
know the law before a judge declared it.  Carter thus frequently declared that 
the customs of the people were “universal” and that there was a uniform 
“national standard of justice.”51 Because judges themselves were “part of the 
community,” they “knew” and “felt” the common standard of justice and 
relied on it when deciding cases.52 The notion of universal custom also 
allowed Carter to suggest that the common law was actually more democratic 
than legislation, particularly when the legislature was dominated by corrupt 
and plutocratic interests.  “Customs . . . being common modes of action, are 
the unerring evidence of common thought and belief, and as they are the joint 
product of the thoughts of all, each one has his own share in forming them.  In 
the enforcement of a rule thus formed no one can complain, for it is the only 
rule which can be framed which gives equal expression to the voice of each.”53 
Carter acknowledged that parties often disagreed about the specific rule to 
be derived from custom in a particular case, but he rarely conceded that such 
clashing positions might be rooted in conflicting customs within the 
community itself.54 Carter could not, of course, deny that there were 
variations in conduct among individuals.55 He argued, however, that such 
differences had largely disappeared as American society had progressed 
toward universal norms of behavior embodying fair dealing and cooperative 
self-restraint.56 When confronting examples of widespread conduct that 
conflicted with these supposedly uniform habits and values, Carter played 
semantic games, terming them “bad practices” rather than “customs.”57 
In sum, Carter’s argument, brewed in the cauldron of the codification wars, 
was that there was an absolute identity between the common law and “the 
social standard of justice,” or “custom.”  “[C]ustom is not simply one of the 
sources of law from which selections may be made and converted into law by 
the independent and arbitrary fiat of a legislature or a court, but . . . law, with 
 
50 CARTER, ORIGIN, GROWTH & FUNCTION, supra note 40, at 255, 277-78.  For an 
extended discussion by Carter on these points, see id. at 225-28. 
51 See, e.g., Carter, Ideal and Actual, supra note 40, at 229; CARTER, PROPOSED 
CODIFICATION, supra note 39, at 41. 
52 CARTER, PROVINCES, supra note 39, at 48.  Because New York judges were directly 
elected, it was not quite as audacious to wrap them in the cloak of democracy as it would 
have been if they were appointed. 
53 CARTER, ORIGIN, GROWTH & FUNCTION, supra note 40, at 143.  
54 Id. at 78. 
55 Id. at 123. 
56 See generally Grossman, supra note 3, at 602-14. 
57 Id., at 613-14. 
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the narrow exception of legislation, is custom.”58 Carter’s view that each and 
every decision by a common law judge reflected shared ethical standards 
required him to describe the decision-making process in a manner strikingly 
different from Langdell. 
 
III. LANGDELL’S CLASSICAL ORTHODOXY 
Before examining the contrasts between Carter’s and Langdell’s common 
law methodologies, it is necessary to review the contours of Langdell’s 
“classical orthodoxy.”  Professor Thomas Grey, the author of Langdell’s 
Orthodoxy, argues that “legal theories are defined by the relations they 
establish among five possible goals of legal systems: comprehensiveness, 
completeness, formality, conceptual order and acceptability.”59 According to 
Grey’s scheme, comprehensiveness concerns the ability a legal system, from a 
procedural perspective, to provide one and only one resolution of every 
dispute within its jurisdiction.  The completeness of a legal system describes 
the degree to which the system’s substantive norms provide a single “right” 
answer for every matter arising under it.  Legal systems fall short of 
completeness if they contain (as perhaps they inevitably do) substantive gaps 
or inconsistencies that require decision makers to exercise discretion.  
Formality concerns the extent to which a legal system dictates the correct 
resolution of cases according to “demonstrative (rationally compelling) 
reasoning.”60 Conceptual order refers to a legal system’s quality of having a 
limited body of coherently-related general principles that themselves generate 
substantive bottom-level rules.  Finally, the goal of acceptability is the pursuit 
of justice and wise policy.  A legal system is acceptable “to the extent that it 
fulfills the ideals and desires of those under its jurisdiction.”61 
Comprehensiveness is the least important element in Grey’s discussion of 
Langdell’s jurisprudence, for it is a procedural factor with no obvious 
relationship to the other four, substantive goals.  According to Grey, the 
foundation for classical orthodoxy was the mutually reinforcing interplay of 
the next three goals on his list: completeness, formality, and conceptual 
order.62 “The heart of classical theory was its aspiration that the legal system 
be made complete through universal formality, and universally formal through 
conceptual order.”63 The goal of acceptability was, in Grey’s view, irreducibly 
in tension with the logically-ordered system represented by the previous three 
 
58 CARTER, ORIGIN, GROWTH & FUNCTION, supra note 40, at 173. 
59 Grey, supra note 4, at 6. 
60 Id. at 8. 
61 Id. at 10.  
62 These qualities are not necessarily dependent on each other.  For example, 
informality does not in and of itself prevent a legal system from being complete or 
conceptually ordered.  Id. at 7-8, 8 n. 27.  Moreover, a lack of conceptual order does not 
invariably mean that a system is informal.  Id. at 9 n. 29.  
63 Id. at 11. 
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goals.  “To let considerations of acceptability directly justify a bottom-level 
rule or individual decision would violate the requirement of conceptual order, 
on which the universal formality and completeness of the system depended.”64 
According to Grey, Langdell’s response to this tension was to push 
acceptability to the margins of his jurisprudence.  In classical orthodox 
thought, considerations of policy and morality were allowed into the system at 
the level of general principles, but they influenced lower-level rules and 
specific decisions only so long as they did not undermine universally formal 
conceptual order.65 Consider, for example, the situation in which one person 
promises another a reward for performing some task.  Should the promisor be 
able to revoke his offer if the promisee has almost, but not entirely, completed 
the task?  Langdell argued yes.  He thought the systematic order of contract 
law, based on the principle of bargained-for consideration, demanded this 
result even though it “may cause great hardship and practical injustice.”66 
Bruce Kimball’s recent work takes issue with Grey’s portrait of Langdell.  
In a historiographic study of scholarship about Langdell, Kimball criticizes 
Grey’s heavy focus on Langdell’s Summary of the Law of Contracts, to the 
exclusion of his work in the fields of procedure, equity, and commercial law 
and his law school casebooks.67 Kimball concludes, “‘[C]lassical orthodoxy 
does not fully comprehend the complexity of Langdell’s jurisprudence, which 
needs to be reassessed in light of a broader and deeper review of Langdell’s 
writings, both published and archival.”68 
In a subsequent article, Kimball conducts such a reassessment of 
Langdell’s contracts scholarship.  He concludes: “Far from conforming to a 
closed, formal system modeled on deductive logic or geometry, Langdell’s 
mode of reasoning . . . is three dimensional, exhibiting a comprehensive yet 
contradictory integration of induction from authority, deduction from 
principle, and analysis of acceptability, including justice and policy.”69 
Although Kimball adds important texture to Grey’s depiction of Langdell, he 
does not remove the Harvard dean from the rank of classicists.  First of all, 
Kimball’s own list of Langdell’s significant contributions to contract doctrine 
includes several foundational features of classical contract law: the movement 
toward abstraction; the identification of offer, acceptance, and consideration as 
the primary dimensions of contract; and the introduction of the bargain theory 
of contract.70 Moreover, Kimball ultimately makes quite tentative and modest 
claims about the role of justice and policy in Langdell’s jurisprudence.  
Although he points to examples in which Langdell appealed to acceptability to 
 
64 Id. at 15. 
65 Id. at 15. 
66 CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 3-4 (2d 
ed., Rothman 1980) (1890). 
67 Kimball, The Langdell Problem, supra note 11, at 316-22. 
68 Id. at 323.   
69  Kimball, supra note 9. 
70 Id.
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supplement his logical derivation of bottom-level rules,71 Kimball never goes 
so far as to suggest that Langdell was willing to sacrifice formal conceptual 
reasoning to reach a preferred result in a particular case.  To the contrary, 
Kimball acknowledges that Langdell “wanted to be, or felt he should be, a 
pure legal formalist,”72 that he “remained committed to . . . inductive and 
parsimonious abstraction,”73 and that he thought the formal legal system 
“provides procedural consistency and evenhandedness, but does not aim at 
substantive justice in the particular dispute.”74 
In short, even after Kimball’s revision, Langdell remains firmly a classicist, 
at least in his contracts scholarship.  Indeed, Kimball himself appears to 
conclude that Langdell was a “moral classicist” of the type identified by 
Siegel.75 Grey’s scheme thus remains a useful tool for analyzing Langdell’s 
jurisprudence.76 And the application of this scheme to Langdell and Carter 
illuminates the stark contrast between them.   
 
III. CODE FORMALISM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 
There were striking similarities between Langdell’s classical common law 
vision and David Dudley Field’s proposed system of codification, at least as 
Carter portrayed it.  Carter’s writings against the Civil Code thus indirectly 
demonstrate the difference between his own jurisprudence and that of 
Langdell.77 
Carter depicted Field’s code as striving for completeness, formality, and 
conceptual order at the expense of equitable outcomes.  Indeed, Carter’s 
crusade against codification was, above all, a battle against deductive 
reasoning.  In his eyes, the primary advantage of the common law approach 
over code systems was the power common law judges had to resolve 
individual cases according to the demands of justice.  Whereas codification 
 
71 Id.
72  Id.
73  Id.
74  Id.
75 Id.
76 As Siegel has demonstrated, Thomas Grey’s scheme is useful for describing all 
classical legal thought, not just the sterile, amoral variety Langdell has long been thought to 
embody.  Siegel, Joel Bishops’s Orthodoxy, supra note 9, at 220-23; Siegel, John Chipman 
Gray, supra note 9, at 1518-27.  
77 Carter himself never remarked on the similarities between code formalism and 
Langdell’s jurisprudence.  Oliver Wendell Holmes did, however.  In 1887, he remarked, “It 
has long seemed to me that the ablest of the agitators for codification, [Englishman] Sir 
James Stephen, and the originator of the present mode of teaching, Mr. Langdell, start from 
the same premises to reach seemingly opposite conclusions.  The number of legal principles 
is small, says, in effect, Sir James Stephen, therefore codify them.  The number of legal 
principles is small, says Mr. Langdell, therefore they may be taught through the cases which 
have developed and established them.”  Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Harvard Law School: 
Judge Holmes’ Oration, 3 L. Q. REV. 118, 121 (1887). 
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would compel courts to decide particular matters by mechanical deduction 
from the principles and rules set forth in the code, the common law achieved 
case-specific fairness by avoiding such rigid formality.  Although Carter 
mounted this justice-based defense of the common law against Field, not 
Langdell, he might as well have been arguing with the Harvard dean himself. 
 
A.  Formal Conceptualism in the Civil Law Tradition 
 
Carter had good reason to equate codification with mechanical formalism, 
for such logical rigidity characterized the legal systems of the many civil law 
countries that had adopted codes over the previous hundred years.  The 
drafters of the Prussian Landrecht, enacted in 1794 under Frederick the Great, 
intended their enormous code to be complete—that is, to serve as the sole 
basis of decision for every case.78 The jurists who prepared the French Civil 
Code of 1804 (the Code Napoléon) were aware of the Prussians’ utter failure 
to articulate a rule for every fact situation.  They thus embraced the much 
more modest goal of setting forth general principles and maxims to be 
developed and applied by judges and jurists.  Nevertheless, the revolutionary 
impulses and rationalist tendencies of the early nineteenth century shaped the 
reception of the Code Napoléon in France and in the many other European and 
Latin American countries that adopted it.  In all these jurisdictions, the Code 
tended to be viewed as a clear and complete source of all law.79 
In an influential work, The Civil Law Tradition, John Henry Merryman 
describes the general views shared by civil law countries about the nature, 
source, and role of law.80 The reality in civil law jurisdictions has always, 
inevitably, strayed from these ideals.  Nonetheless, nineteenth-century jurists 
clung to these core principles stubbornly, even when violating them in 
practice.  Modern civil law theorists, by contrast, have assumed an 
 
78 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 29 (2d ed. 1987). 
79 Id. at 32-33.  Jeremy Bentham and John Austin, influential nineteenth-century legal 
philosophers in Great Britain, also shared the vision of a complete code, although they did 
not succeed in persuading their countrymen to enact one.  MAURICE EUGEN LANG,
CODIFICATION IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND AMERICA 28-58 (1924).  German jurists 
quarreled about the possible adoption of a unified national code throughout much of the 
nineteenth century.  The debate commenced with a famous 1814 exchange between Thibaut 
and Savigny over the advisability of codification.  Savigny, who opposed codification, 
prevailed in this dispute, and his arguments gave birth to the historical school of 
jurisprudence.  See  Reimann, supra 2.  Nevertheless, a body of German jurists continued to 
push for codification, and they ultimately succeeded with the adoption of the German Civil 
Code of 1896, which went into effect in 1900. 
80 Merryman defines a legal “tradition” as “a set of deeply rooted, historically 
conditioned attitudes about the nature of law, about the role of law in the society and the 
polity, about the proper organization and operation of a legal system, and about the way law 
is or should be made, applied, studied perfected, and taught.”  MERRYMAN, supra note 78, 
at 2. 
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increasingly flexible attitude toward traditional civil law principles, although 
Merryman contends that the pure model continues to shape their mindset as a 
kind of “folklore.”81 
At the center of the civil law tradition lay notions of legislative positivism 
and the separation of powers.  Judges were meant to perform only the 
relatively minor function of mechanically applying statutory provisions to the 
facts at hand.82 The lawmaking power lay solely in the legislature and, to the 
degree the legislature delegated it, in the executive and the administrative 
organs of the state.83 In a codified legal system, such legislative positivism 
demanded that the code be totally coherent, consistent, and complete, so that 
judges had no room to make law themselves.84 The insistence that judges not 
make law was joined to a related emphasis on the importance of legal 
certainty.  Civil law jurists believed that certainty was best ensured by a 
decision-making process insulated from judicial discretion. 
Another central feature of the civil law approach was its rejection of the 
authority of judicial precedent.  Stare decisis was flatly inconsistent with civil 
law theorists’ legislative positivism.  Because judicial decisions were not 
themselves sources of law, courts could not be bound by prior decisions.  
Moreover, while many common law jurists viewed the doctrine of stare decisis 
as a foundation for certainty, their civil law counterparts, as noted above, 
tended to see any judicial power over legal development as fostering 
uncertainty.  Therefore, in civil law countries, unlike in common law 
jurisdictions, there was no official judge-created body of law.  Moreover, civil 
law judges felt freer than their English and American counterparts to depart 
from prior judicial interpretations of statutory provisions, even interpretations 
by higher courts.85 
If the code was supposed to be the sole basis for deciding every case, how 
did civil law jurists deal with situations in which there were gaps (lacuanae) in 
 
81 See, e.g., id. at 46-47.  By presenting my discussion of the civil law tradition in the 
past tense, I thus do not intend to imply that the tradition is dead today. 
82 Id. at 34-38; JOHN P. DAWSON, ORACLES OF THE LAW 392 (1968).  For similar views 
of the judicial role among English and American codifiers, see Jeremy Bentham, General 
View of the Complete Code of Laws, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, 155, 210 (vol. 3, 
John Borwing ed.) (1962); COOK, supra note 2, at 83-87. 
83 Civil law jurists also recognized, through various intellectual contortions, that 
custom was a source of law, although a subsidiary and not especially significant one.  
MERRYMAN note 83, at 23.  Supporters of codification in America tended to downplay the 
importance of custom even in the common law system they sought to replace.  New York 
Civil Code supporter Robert Ludlow Fowler remarked, “Even if Mr. Carter intended to 
refer to custom as a source of law, his reference entirely overlooks the fact that custom has 
never, in this State, been in any way a fertile source of law.”  ROBERT LUDLOW FOWLER,
CODIFICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 9 (1884). 
84 MERRYMAN, supra note 78, at 29; DAWSON, supra note 82, at 393-94. 
85 MERRYMAN, supra note 78, at 22, 36.  Merryman notes that in modern practice, civil 
law judges are in fact influenced by prior decisions, even though stare decisis is not central 
to the civil law approach, as it is to the common law system.  Id. at 47.  See also DAWSON,
supra note 82, at 400-31. 
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the code, or in which the strict application of code provisions produced clearly 
inequitable results?  In short, they adopted an approach to code interpretation 
similar to the conceptual logical formalism of Langdell’s common law 
jurisprudence.  James Herget and Stephen Wallace explain the dominant 
nineteenth-century civil law view concerning statutory gaps: 
 
For the positivists there was no gap problem.  The positive laws, including the 
authorized rules of construction and interpretation, were the only sources to 
which a judge could resort in deciding a case. . . .  In this view, the law could 
not logically have any gaps.  Law was autonomous, a closed universe of given 
rules.  To admit of gaps would be to admit that judges could decide cases 
according to something other than law!  Positivists would concede that there 
could be and were problems of legal construction and interpretation, and the 
application of law to a particular case could sometimes be difficult.  But the 
problem was one of logic and the meaning of words.86 
Civil law thinkers manifested a similarly formalist attitude toward the 
problem of unfair outcomes.  They recognized that resolving matters through 
the mechanical application of code provisions could sacrifice case-specific 
fairness, but the dominant view in the civil law tradition was (and remains 
today) that the interest of certainty outweighs that of equity.87 Merryman 
explains: 
 
In its general sense, equity refers to the power of the judge to mitigate the 
harshness of strict application of a statute, or to allocate property or 
responsibility according to the facts of the individual case. . . .  It is a 
recognition that broad rules, such as those commonly encountered in statutes, 
occasionally work harshly or inadequately, and that some problems are so 
complex that it is not possible for the legislature to dictate the consequences of 
all possible permutations of the facts. . . .  It clearly implies a grant of 
discretionary power to the judge.  But in the civil law tradition, to give 
discretionary power to the judge threatens the certainty of the law.  As a matter 
of legal theory, the position has been taken that judges have no inherent 
equitable power.  They may from time to time be granted authority to use 
equity in the disposition of a case, but this grant of power will be expressly 
made and carefully circumscribed in a statute enacted by the legislature.88 
Because equity was a legislative prerogative rather than a judicial one, a 
judge was not free to pursue justice in an individual case by departing from the 
 
86 James E. Herget & Stephen Wallace, The German Free Law Movement as the 
Source of American Legal Realism, 73 VA. L. REV. 399, 404 (1987).  Civil law jurisdictions 
have gradually accepted the inevitability of lacunae and the appropriateness of judicial 
interpretation when they occur.  However, to preserve the illusion that courts do not make 
law, many writers have extensively expounded on the supposedly nondiscretionary bases 
for such interpretation.  See MERRYMAN, supra note 78, at 43-46. 
87 See generally MERRYMAN, supra note 78, at 48-55. 
88 Id. at 49. 
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clear application of an unambiguous provision.  Describing the attitude of the 
dominant “exegetical school” of French jurists in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century, John P. Dawson writes, “It was improper to mention 
‘equity,’ to assess the weight of competing interests, or make estimates of 
consequences.”89 Jaro Mayda terms the prevailing approach to codes among 
nineteenth-century civil law jurists “exegetic positivism.”  In his words, these 
jurists combined “the positivist myth that legislated law is exclusive and self-
sufficient” with the “exegetic method . . . of erecting upon the legislative text a 
system of concepts handled in closed circuit by means of formal logic, 
independently of the changing world of facts.”90 
At the end of the century, some French scholars challenged this dominant 
mode of code interpretation.  They recognized that “a mere self-contained 
body of logical rules failed before the infinite variety of problems which 
progressing industrialisation [sic] in particular raised in France as everywhere 
else.”91 By far the most important such jurist was Francois Gény, who, in his 
influential Méthode d’Interprétation et Sources en Droit Privé Positif (1899), 
argued that a judge confronted with a gap in the law must freely search for the 
rule of decision among the needs and values of society.92 
Gény was followed in the early twentieth century by the German “free 
law” school, including scholars such as Hermann Kantorowicz, Eugen Ehrlich, 
and Ernst Fuchs.  These jurists, who were vital inspirations for Roscoe Pound 
and, through him, the American legal realists, expanded on Gény’s arguments 
with reference to the German Civil Code, which went into effect in 1900.  
They contended that the logical and conceptual method of code interpretation 
was a deceptive cloak for creative judging.  They urged judges to candidly 
embrace their role as creative law makers and, with the aid of social science, to 
base their decisions on sources outside the formal law.93 
The debate between Carter and Field took place in the 1880s, however, 
without the benefit of these later insights by Gény and the free law theorists.  
In civil law countries that had embraced codes by that time, the vision of law 
as a logically deductive, self-contained system remained largely unchallenged.  
Therefore, Carter and his allies naturally assumed that codification would 
bring the same characteristics to New York law.  Because they saw the 
 
89 DAWSON, supra note 82, at 392, 394.  Modern civil law jurists generally agree that 
courts can properly reinterpret statutory provisions to produce acceptable resolutions of 
cases in light of changing social circumstances.  MERRYMAN, supra note 78, at 45-46.  It is 
important to recognize, however, that such “evolutive interpretation” is deemed appropriate 
only when there is some ambiguity in the statute requiring interpretation in the first place.  
Much of the scholarship regarding “evolutive interpretation” is dedicated to establishing 
that such interpretation does not constitute judicial lawmaking.  Id. 
90 JARO MAYDA, FRANCOIS GÉNY AND MODERN JURISPRUDENCE 5 (1978). 
91 WOLFGANG GASTON FRIEDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 161 (1953). 
92 See MAYDA, supra note 90, at 5-6; Herget & Wallace, supra note 86, at 409-11. 
93 On the free law movement, see Herget & Wallace, supra note 86, at 411-17.  On its 
influence on Pound and the realists, see id. at 422-34. 
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common law as flexible and equitable, and valued it for these qualities, they 
were thus predisposed to oppose Field’s efforts. 
 
B.  The Contest Over the Significance of American Codification 
1.  Field’s Modest Claims.—Although Field and his allies eagerly 
trumpeted the proposed New York Civil Code’s coherence and clarity, they 
vigorously disclaimed any ambition of enacting a complete code that would be 
the exclusive source of law, as were the codes of continental Europe.  Field 
remarked: “What do we mean by codification?  Not that which many lawyers 
imagine it to be.  They conjure up a phantom and then proceed to curse it and 
to fight it.  Their imaginations portray it as a body of enactments governing 
and intended to govern every transaction in human affairs, present and future, 
seen and unforseen, universal, unchangeable and exclusive.  That is not our 
meaning.”94 Field frequently reiterated this point, on one occasion punctuating 
it with a direct dig at Carter: “Nobody but an idiot supposes that.”95 
The New York codifiers seem to have concluded that they had to frame 
their proposal as a moderate one to win support from at least some members of 
the state’s relatively conservative bar.  Therefore, they usually presented the 
prospect of codification in evolutionary rather than revolutionary terms.96 
Field and his supporters frequently pointed out that the Civil Code was made 
up primarily of principles and rules already settled by common law judges.  
Moreover, they suggested that the code would play a less dominant role in 
New York’s legal system than it did in civil law jurisdictions.  Common law 
precedent would remain in force where not directly displaced by code 
provisions, and judges would continue to serve a vital function.  Field argued 
that his proposal would thus make the law of the state more certain and 
accessible while preserving the common law’s flexibility.  Field’s decision to 
grant the courts an important role in filling the Civil Code’s gaps likely 
reflected not only political calculation, but also his own common law 
breeding.  
In his introduction to the code, Field directly addressed the phenomenon of 
gaps. He explained: 
 
[I]f there be an existing rule of law omitted from this Code, and not 
inconsistent with it, that rule will continue to exist in the same form in which it 
now exists; . . . and if new cases arise, as they will, which have not been 
foreseen, they may be decided, if decided at all, precisely as they would now be 
 
94 Field, supra note 48, at 1-2. 
95 REP. NINTH ANN. MEETING A.B.A. 68-69 (1886). 
96 The New York codifiers’ approach was thus very different from that of their 
counterparts in California.  The latter, in light of California’s youth and its desire to achieve 
respect in other states and in foreign nations, decided that it was strategically wise to 
present codification as a revolutionary advance.  Grossman, supra note 2. 
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decided, that is to say, by analogy to some rule in the Code, or to some rule 
omitted from the Code and therefore still existing, or by the dictates of natural 
justice.97 
By rules “omitted from this Code,” Field meant common law doctrines 
developed by the courts.   
Civil law theorists would have agreed with Field so far as he asserted that 
courts should decide cases not directly addressed by the code by using 
analogies to code provisions or, as a last resort, the principles of natural law.98 
Field diverged from his continental counterparts, however, by also allowing 
courts to continue to refer to the common law, a body of rules derived solely 
from judicial precedents.99 Robert Ludlow Fowler, the author of a major 
pamphlet supporting Field’s code, reassured his readers that codification 
would not “arrest the spontaneous development of the common law.”  He 
declared, “All writers on codification agree that the development of new law 
beyond and in addition to that expressed in a code is inevitable . . . .”100 
Field and his allies thus maintained that the common law would live on to 
fill gaps in the code.  Lacunae were not the only problem intrinsic to 
codification, however; there was also the dilemma of inequitable outcomes 
resulting from the direct application of clearly applicable code provisions.  As 
discussed above, civil law theorists generally thought it was better to accept 
the occasional unfair result than to sacrifice certainty or compromise 
legislative supremacy.  In the paragraph from the introduction to the Civil 
Code quoted above, Field seemed to manifest a similar reluctance to permit 
courts to stray from the direct application of statutory provisions; he allowed 
the continuation of common law rules only when those rules were “not 
inconsistent with” code provisions.  Fowler, however, suggested that courts 
might look to common law precedents to modify an unjust result clearly 
dictated by the language of the Civil Code.  He asserted that the anticodifiers 
erred by “assuming that the Code provides for all cases and that new 
difficulties, clearly beyond the equity of the statute, will be dealt with 
improperly.  If codification were, in fact, to put an end to the proper solution 
 
97 Introduction, CIVIL CODE, supra note 26, at xix. 
98 MERRYMAN, supra note 78, at 44-45. 
99 Interestingly, Field suggested that even if common law precedents were preserved to 
supplement the code, his system still would not be complete, that is, it would not provide a 
solution for every case.  He noted, “In cases where the law is not declared by the Code . . . 
[and] an analogy cannot be found, nor any [common law] rule which has been overlooked 
and omitted, then the courts will have either to decide, as at present, without reference to 
any settled rule of law, or to leave the case undecided, as was done by Lord MANSFIELD, in 
King v. Hay . . . trusting to future legislation for future cases.”  Introduction, CIVIL CODE,
supra note 26, at xviii.  See Grey, supra note 4, at 7 n. 20; MERRYMAN, supra note 78, at 
39-40 (discussing similar approaches in France and Germany).  Field thus indicated that the 
legal system he proposed for New York was not only incomplete, but also not 
comprehensive—certain matters would simply remain unresolved. 
100 FOWLER, supra note 83, at 51. 
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of new difficulties or to circumscribe the common law judicial powers, we 
might well pause before entering upon systematic codification.”101 
The proposed Civil Code itself contained language demonstrating that 
Field was not quite a purist with regard to legislative positivism.  The code 
was consistent with civil law theory so far as it declared: “Law is a rule of 
property and of conduct, prescribed by the sovereign power of the state.”  
Civil law jurists would not, however, have agreed with the next provision, 
which stated that “the will of the sovereign” was expressed not only by the 
Constitution and by acts of the legislature and subordinate legislative bodies, 
but also by “the judgments of the tribunals enforcing those rules, which, 
though not enacted, form what is known as the customary or common law.”102 
Field thus enshrined the authority of judicial precedent in a manner totally 
alien to the civil law.  He did not clearly explain in either his writings or in the 
code itself whether court decisions interpreting code provisions should be 
treated as binding precedent.  He left no doubt, however, that cases not 
covered by the code would be decided “precisely as they would now be 
decided,”103 that is, based on prior court decisions and the doctrine of stare 
decisis (as well as by reference to other code provisions and natural justice).  
Field’s affirmation that the common law would survive codification, at 
least in the code’s interstices, seems curious in light of his repeated attacks on 
the common law’s “judge-made” character.104 After all, one of Field’s 
primary arguments in favor of codification was that it would preserve the 
separation of powers.105 There is obvious tension between Field’s 
acknowledgment of the continuing authority of judicial precedent and his 
argument that judicial lawmaking “will commend itself to no one in this 
country of popular institutions where it is a fundamental idea that the functions 
of government should be devolved upon distinct departments . . . .”106 
Perhaps, as an intellectual matter, Field resolved this dissonance by 
adopting John Austin’s view that the legislature tacitly delegated its sovereign 
power to the courts for limited purposes.107 Field himself does not appear to 
have articulated this theory in writing.  But Fowler, one of his more 
jurisprudentially sophisticated supporters, referred to Austin’s argument, 
 
101 Id. at 17. 
102 CIVIL CODE, supra note 26, at §§ 2, 3.  The code then explicitly provided, “The 
evidence of the common law is found in the decisions of the tribunals.”  Id. at § 5. 
103 Id. at xix. 
104 See, e.g., Introduction, CIVIL CODE, supra note 26, at xxx; David Dudley Field, 
Reasons for the Adoption of the Codes, in 1 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS AND MISCELLANEOUS 
PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 361, 368 (A. P. Sprague ed., 1884) [hereinafter Field, 
Reasons for Adoption].. 
105 Infra p. [ ].  See also Introduction, CIVIL CODE, supra note 26, at xxi-xiii, xxx-xxxi 
(other articulations of the separation of powers point).  
106 Field, Reasons for Adoption, supra note 104, at 369. 
107 JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 35 (Wilfrid E. 
Rumble ed., 1995).  See also PETER J. KING, UTILITARIAN JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICA 358, 
364-66 (1986). 
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remarking: “The analytical jurists have demonstrated that under any advanced 
type of government laws are evolved in two modes, by the legislature proper, 
and by the various subordinate persons possessing law-making powers.  
Among the latter are the judges . . . .”108 
By denying that his code was meant to be a complete system of law, Field 
was resisting his opponents’ charge that he was a grandiose idealist, dedicated, 
like England’s Jeremy Bentham, to extirpating the common law and making 
the law judge-proof.  The political advantages of Field’s modest pose were 
clear.  It allowed code supporters to present Field’s scheme as an incremental, 
pragmatic step rather than a wholesale rejection of Anglo-American 
jurisprudence.  Fowler observed, “Mr. Field has always, [with respect to the 
issue of completeness,] rejected the notions of his scientific allies, thereby 
giving . . . evidence of the eminently practical direction of his labors.”109
2.  Carter’s Depiction of Field as Legal Imperialist—By contrast, it 
behooved Carter, as the leader of the anticodification forces, to magnify the 
differences between Field’s proposal and the common law status quo.  If the 
proponents of codification could persuade legislators that the Civil Code was 
merely an inoffensive, sensible way to make the law more certain and 
accessible, Carter and his colleagues would have a difficult time defeating it.  
They thus had to present a convincing case that Field’s plan would suddenly, 
significantly, and detrimentally transform New York’s legal system.   
As mentioned previously, Carter and his allies frequently pointed 
accusingly to substantive alterations in state law contained in Field’s Civil 
Code.  The anticodifiers argued not only that these unacknowledged changes 
would foster general confusion, but also that many of the particular changes 
were unwise, or even corrupt.110 But in Carter’s view, the real radicalism of 
Field’s code lay not in its substantive content, but in its ambition to provide 
the sole basis for deciding every single case.  He contended that the code 
would supplant decisional law more completely than Field acknowledged and 
would reduce judges’ role to the mechanical application of statutory language.  
In short, Carter attempted to portray Field’s Civil Code as an arrogant, grand 
scheme that would render New York’s legal system indistinguishable from 
that of Napoleon’s France.111 The legal realist Karl Llewellyn later observed 
that Carter attacked “not codification as . . .  a fresh and fertile start for case 
law, which at its best already incorporates existing tendencies . . .  but the 
 
108 FOWLER, supra note 83, at 9. 
109 Id. at 52.  Fowler makes clear that by “scientific” codifiers, he means Bentham and 
Austin, among others.  Id. at 40-41 
110 See supra p. [  ]. 
111 Carter frequently emphasized that codes were characteristic of despotic states, 
whereas the common law typified democracies and free societies.  See, e.g., CARTER,
PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 39, at 6-9. 
LANGDELL UPSIDE-DOWN 
 
22
utopian ideal of the blinder advocates of codification: a closed system, 
‘certain’—and dead.”112 
Carter’s portrait of Field as a jurisprudential revolutionary hinged on his 
assertion that Field intended the Civil Code to be a complete system of law.  
Carter sneered at his rival’s claim that the code did not profess to provide for 
all future cases, but only “to give the general rules upon the subjects to which 
it relates, which are now known and recognized.”113 Field could have put such 
an explicit limitation in the code itself, Carter observed, but he did not do so, 
because “this would have utterly destroyed his code, qua code, by converting 
it into a ridiculous digest.”114 Carter concluded that Field “either did not mean 
that his code should have the limited operation he asserts for it, or he intended 
to conceal his meaning while he was urging its adoption.”115 
Carter argued that a complete code was simply incompatible with justice, 
for no code could ever contain a sufficient number of rules to fairly resolve 
every dispute that might arise.  He summarized the problem as follows: 
 
Codification . . . consists in enacting rules, and such rules must, . . . from their 
very nature, cover future and unknown, as well as past and known cases; and so 
far as it covers future and unknown cases, it is no law that deserves the name.  
It does not embody justice; it is a mere jump in the dark; it is a violent framing 
of rules without reference to justice, which may or may not rightly dispose of 
the cases which may fall under them.116 
In the introduction to his Civil Code, Field disclaimed any intent to offer a 
rule for every case.  He asserted that the code “cannot provide for all possible 
cases which the future may disclose.  It does not profess to provide for them.  
All that it professes is to give the general rules upon the subjects to which it 
relates which are now known and recognised.”117 Carter pointedly responded 
that the code’s generality was in fact its most insidious feature.   
 
This notion that the operation of a rule may be restricted by making it more 
general, seems highly absurd.  Every one must see that the more general an 
enacted rule is, the more of future unknown cases it will cover.  Suppose a 
general rule were enacted that promises made upon consideration were binding.  
This, if it is made to mean anything, means that all such promises are binding, 
and the rule would cover a multitude of invalid promises, such as those made 
by infants or insane persons, or fraudulent promises, or promises against public 
policy.118 
112 Karl N. Llewellyn, Carter, James Coolidge, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES (1931). 
113 Introduction, CIVIL CODE, supra note 26, at xviii. 
114 CARTER, ORIGIN, GROWTH & FUNCTION, supra note 40, at 274 
115 Id. at 274. 
116 CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 39, at 33. 
117 Introduction, CIVIL CODE, supra note 26, at xviii. 
118 CARTER, ORIGIN, GROWTH & FUNCTION, supra note 40, at 274. 
LANGDELL UPSIDE-DOWN 
 
23
 
A code could be universally fair only by setting forth every exception to 
every rule, and then every exception to every exception.  As Carter observed, 
drafting such a code was an impossible task, because the complex affairs of 
society generated an innumerable variety of disputes and thus an innumerable 
variety of ethical problems.119 In short, Carter concluded that because the very 
process of reasoning from the general to the particular conflicted with the 
demands of justice, codification would inevitably produce unfair outcomes.  
 
3.  The Derogation Rule and the Example of California—Carter’s assertion 
that the Civil Code’s text alone would dictate the result of almost every case 
had a firm basis in the language of the draft code itself.  The provision 
affirming the continuing authority of the common law, discussed above,120 
seemed to be largely negated by two other provisions.  One of these stated, “In 
this State there is no common law, in any case, where the law is declared by 
the five Codes.”121 In other words, the code would sweep away all judicial 
precedents in its path.  Another section ensured that this path would be a wide 
one.  It declared, “The rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are 
to be strictly construed, has no application to this Code.”122 This provision 
was critical, for the completeness of the code hinged on it.  
The Civil Code’s provision regarding derogation abandoned a canon of 
statutory construction generally observed by American courts.  As one late 
nineteenth-century treatise writer wrote, “[I]n this country, the rule has 
assumed the form of a dogma, that all statutes in derogation of the common 
law, or out of the course of the common law, are to be construed strictly.”123 
Another scholar elaborated, “It is not presumed that the legislature intended to 
make any innovation upon the common law further than the necessity of the 
case required.”124 Roscoe Pound later condemned the derogation rule as an 
obstacle to necessary legislative innovation.  He researched its history and 
acidly concluded that “this wise and ancient rule of the common law is, in 
substance, an American product of the nineteenth century,” rooted in judicial 
antipathy toward legislative intrusion.125 
In the context of the codification debate, however, the derogation rule was 
embraced not to undermine progressive legislation, but to preserve for codified 
jurisdictions the flexibility and fairness of common law decision making.  In 
 
119 CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 39, at 36. 
120 Supra p. [  ]. 
121 CIVIL CODE, supra note 26, at § 6. 
122 Id. at § 2032.  Interestingly, sections 6 and 2032 appeared almost as far apart in the 
Civil Code as possible; the latter was the third-to-last section.  It is possible that Field 
separated them to obscure their combined impact. 
123 G. A. ENDLICH, A COMMENTARY ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 174 (1888). 
124 JOHN LEWIS, SUTHERLAND’S STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 862 (2d ed., 
vol. II 1904).  This appears to be a paraphrase of 1 Kent, Comm. 464. 
125 Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 402 (1908). 
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1872, California had enacted its own Civil Code, which was largely a copy of 
Field’s proposed code for New York.126 In 1884, John Norton Pomeroy, an 
eminent treatise writer and the first dean of the Hastings College of Law, 
published an influential multipart article entitled The True Method of 
Interpreting the Civil Code, in which he opposed making the Civil Code the 
sole, or even the primary, source of California law.  He argued that judges 
should instead view the Civil Code, whenever possible, as merely a 
declaration of existing common law rules and interpret it using common law 
precedents. 
 
Except in the comparatively few instances where the language is so clear and 
unequivocal as to leave no doubt of an intention to depart from, alter, or 
abrogate the common-law rule concerning the subject matter, the courts should 
avowedly adopt and follow without deviation the uniform principle of 
interpreting all the definitions, statements of doctrines, and rules contained in 
the code in complete conformity with the common-law definitions, doctrines, 
and rules, and as to all the subordinate effects resulting from such 
interpretations.127 
As one scholar has observed, Pomeroy’s purpose was to establish a method by 
which the code would be read “as completely as possible as if it did not 
change a thing.”128 
126 The legislature enacted the Civil Code as one element of a four-part California 
Code.  The other segments were a Criminal Code, a Political Code, and a revised Code of 
Civil Procedure, all of which were also based on Field’s work.  See Grossman, supra note 2, 
at 617.  The Civil Code as first enacted was identical to Field’s New York draft, except for 
some revisions to accommodate earlier California legislation.  In 1874, however, the 
California code was extensively amended to resolve the many additional conflicts between 
the code and prior statutes and decisions that had become apparent during the code’s first 
two years of operation.  Maurice E. Harrison, The First Half-Century of the California Civil 
Code, 10 CAL. L. REV. 185, 187-88 (1922). 
127 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, THE ‘CIVIL CODE’ IN CALIFORNIA 51 (1885) (reprint of 
John Norton Pomeroy, The True Method of Interpreting the Civil Code, 3 WEST COAST REP.
585, 657, 691, 717 (1884); 4 WEST COAST REP. 1, 49, 109, 145 (1884)) [hereinafter 
POMEROY, CIVIL CODE].  
128 William B. Fisch, The Dakota Civil Code: More Notes for an Uncelebrated 
Centennial, 45 N.D. L. REV. 9, 29 (1969).  Although the language of the California Civil 
Code offered a somewhat better basis for Pomeroy’s interpretive approach than did Field’s 
New York draft, it was hardly clear what method of interpretation the California version 
called for.  The California Code Commissioners had added a section to Field’s code stating, 
“The provisions of this Code, so far as they are substantially the same as . . . the common 
law, must be construed as continuations thereof, and not as new enactments.” CAL. CIV.
CODE § 5 (1872).  However, this section, which seemed to support the application of the 
derogation doctrine championed by Pomeroy, was paired with one revoking the doctrine in 
language equivalent to that in the Field code.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 4 (1872).  The relationship 
between these apparently inconsistent provisions was perplexing.  Not surprisingly, 
Pomeroy did not refer to them at all in setting forth his argument.  For a general discussion 
of the complicated relationship between the California Civil Code and the common law, see 
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In 1885, shortly after Pomeroy’s death, the Association of the Bar of the 
City of New York’s Special Committee to Urge the Rejection of the Proposed 
Civil Code resolved that Pomeroy’s article be reprinted and circulated in New 
York to illustrate the dangers of enacting Field’s code.  The ABCNY issued it 
as a pamphlet titled The “Civil Code” in California. Because the Civil Code 
enacted in California was largely identical to the New York draft, Pomeroy’s 
criticisms were especially useful to the New Yorkers’ anticodification 
campaign.129 He blasted Field’s work as a bramble of “defects, imperfections, 
omissions, and . . . inconsistencies,” the uncertainty of which was exacerbated 
by the drafters’ “unnecessary practice of abandoning well-known legal terms 
and phrases . . . and of adopting instead thereof an unknown and hitherto 
unused language and terminology.”130 Pomeroy argued that the theory of 
interpretation he recommended would ameliorate the confusion caused by 
these flaws.131 
More important, for purposes of this discussion, Pomeroy also criticized 
the overgenerality of the Civil Code’s provisions.  
 
In considering the language of the civil code, the fact must be constantly 
remembered that it does not purport to embody in a statutory form all of the 
existing rules of the law upon any subject whatsoever.  It contains only general 
definitions, the statements of general doctrines, and a few very special rules.  
The great mass of the special rules of the law, applicable to particular 
circumstances, may be to some extent inferences from the doctrines which are 
formulated, but they are certainly not expressed in the text of the code.132 
Pomeroy argued that because the Civil Code omitted most rules governing 
particular fact situations, it engendered unfair outcomes.  He explained, 
“Statutory rules once enacted cannot be readily modified and expanded by the 
courts so as to cover new facts and relations not included within their 
expressed terms.”133 Pomeroy asserted that this rigidity was a major flaw, for 
an ideal legal system “should be flexible, containing provisions for exceptions 
to [its] general requirements, so that when a case does not fall within the 
 
Izhak Englard, Li v. Yellow Cab Co.—A Belated and Inglorious Centennial of the 
California Civil Code, 65 CAL. L. REV. 4 (1977). 
129 In a prefatory note to the pamphlet, the special committee remarked that because the 
California code was “for the most part, a copy” of Field’s proposed Civil Code for New 
York, Pomeroy’s conclusions were “of peculiar value to the legislators of New York, and to 
all others whose duty or curiosity may excite in them an interest in the question of 
Codification of the Common Law.”  Special Committee of the New York City Bar 
Association to Urge the Rejection of the Proposed Civil Code, Introduction to POMEROY,
supra note 127, at 3. 
130 POMEROY, supra note 127, at 6-7. 
131 Id. at 7. 
132 Id. at 32. 
133 Id. at 53. 
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reason, although it may within the letter, of a regulation, it shall not be 
controlled by such rule contrary to justice and equity.”134 
In Pomeroy’s view, if a codified doctrine were “interpreted textually, with 
no reference to the pre-existing law,” it would be “rigid and inflexible in its 
operation, and capable of applying to one condition of fact alone.”  
Consequently, “[a]ll the flexibility, justice, and equity of the common law 
doctrine would be lost at one blow.”135 Pomeroy contended that the only way 
to solve this problem was by embracing a strong version of the derogation 
rule, that is, “by interpreting all the provisions of the code as declaratory of the 
common law or equitable doctrines and rules, unless the intent to make a 
change clearly appears from the unequivocal language of the text.”136 In other 
words, judges should reject a direct textual approach and instead read each 
code provision as “simply declaratory of the established common law general 
doctrine, without modification,” so that “all the special rules on the subject, 
laid down by the courts, by which persons are declared to be liable under a 
great variety of special circumstances, would still remain in full force . . . .”137 
In short, Pomeroy maintained that the Civil Code should play an extremely 
minimal role in California’s legal system.  He urged judges to turn to the 
common law, not only to clarify ambiguities and resolve conflicts in the code, 
but also to derive lower-level rules that were flatly inconsistent with the code’s 
general language.  He asserted that courts should not “interpret each provision 
of the code textually, according to its literal terms, without reference to the 
pre-existing law or equity.”138 Pomeroy’s court-centered vision of code 
interpretation stood in stark contrast to the legislative positivism of civil law 
jurists.139 
Pomeroy’s denunciation of the California Civil Code’s vague and 
unfamiliar language was an attack on that instrument in particular, but his 
condemnation of the way the code’s general provisions produced unfair 
outcomes in specific cases posed a challenge to all European-style 
codification.  The former problem might be corrected through redrafting, but 
the latter seemed intrinsic to codification itself, unless Pomeroy’s mode of 
interpretation were adopted.  After all, no code could directly address every 
 
134 Id. (quoting from his own treatise, MUNICIPAL LAW). 
135 Id. at 55. 
136 Id. at 62. 
137 Id. at 63. 
138 Id. at 62. 
139 In 1888, the California Supreme Court explicitly adopted Pomeroy’s interpretive 
method in Sharon v. Sharon, 16 P. 345 (Cal. 1888).  The Sharon court’s embrace of 
Pomeroy’s mode of interpretation was, however, apparently limited to unclear code 
provisions, like the one at issue in that case.  The court did not consider Pomeroy’s 
contention that even an unambiguous code provision should be construed as a continuation 
of the common law, including subordinate common law rules inconsistent with the code’s 
text. 
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concatenation of facts that might emerge.140 Surprisingly, Pomeroy did not 
reject the theoretical possibility of pure codification.141 Nevertheless, he 
indicated that it would be extraordinarily difficult to draft a code clear, 
complete, and flexible enough to make his nonderogation approach 
unnecessary.   
Although Pomeroy and Carter, working on opposite coasts, appear to have 
arrived at their conclusions independently, they offered many parallel 
arguments.142 Carter echoed Pomeroy’s criticisms of the Civil Code’s 
ambiguities and gaps.143 More important, Carter voiced similar concerns 
about the code’s excessive generality.  He, too, believed that the instrument’s 
broadly-stated provisions were ill-equipped to address the manifold variety of 
factual circumstances confronted by courts.  Indeed, Carter took this argument 
farther than Pomeroy; he argued that justice was so fact-specific that no code 
could, even in theory, resolve every case fairly.  In other words, because the 
very notion of codification implied some degree of generalization, codification 
was incompatible with justice.  
Carter, like Pomeroy, believed that the liberal application of the derogation 
doctrine would help assuage the problems caused by codification, and he 
highlighted the Civil Code’s express abrogation of the derogation rule as 
evidence of Field’s jurisprudential imperialism.144 Nevertheless, Roscoe 
Pound was wrong when he caustically identified Carter as one of the leading 
proponents of the derogation rule.145 In contrast to Pomeroy, Carter did not 
 
140 Most codifiers have recognized the impossibility of spelling out in detail the rules 
governing all fact situations that might arise.  The most notable exception was Frederick the 
Great, whose Prussian Landrecht of 1794 contained over seventeen thousand provisions 
intended to resolve every possible dispute without any need for judicial interpretation.  This 
quixotic effort was, of course, a failure, as uncertainties arose and courts were forced to 
interpret the code rather than apply it mechanistically.  MERRYMAN, supra note 78, at 29, 
39.  Field himself, as noted above, acknowledged that he did not strive to provide for every 
possible case, but rather to provide “general rules.” 
141 See POMEROY, supra note 127, at 67 (“It may be possible to draw up a code of the 
private civil jurisprudence, to which the principle of interpretation which I have thus 
advocated would not necessarily apply.”)   
142 Carter apparently wrote his first anticodification pamphlet, THE PROPOSED 
CODIFICATION OF OUR COMMON LAW, in late 1883, and it was published in early 1884.  
Pomeroy’s series of articles appeared in the WEST COAST REPORTER shortly afterward, in 
September and October 1884.  Neither author mentioned the other in these works. 
143 See, e.g., CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 39, at 104 (the Civil Code’s 
provisions on the Law of General Averages are “heavily charged with both mischievous 
uncertainty and with positive error.”); CARTER, ARGUMENT, supra note 29, at 24 (quoting 
Pomeroy’s assertion that the code was “full of defects, imperfections, omissions, and even 
inconsistencies”).   
144 CARTER, ORIGIN, GROWTH & FUNCTION, supra note 40, at 308. 
145 Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 HARV. L. 
REV. 591, 601 (1911).  Pound intimated that Carter’s support of the doctrine was part of a 
general attack on progressive legislation.  In fact, however, Carter discussed the derogation 
rule in a context wholly unrelated to progressive reform.  He pointed to the Civil Code’s 
explicit renunciation of the rule simply to support his contention that Field was a 
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discuss the rule extensively.  Their difference in emphasis can be explained 
largely by the contrasting situations they confronted.  Pomeroy was attempting 
to minimize the negative effects of an already-enacted code.  Carter, by 
contrast, was fighting to prevent codification from occurring in the first place.  
He would not have advanced this cause by dwelling on an interpretive method 
that might ameliorate the inequities of a code system.  Instead, Carter shrewdly 
contended that under Field’s plan, the common law would simply cease to 
exist in New York, and each case would be resolved, based not on the justice 
of the particular situation, but on cold deduction from codified principles and 
rules.146 
In light of this argument, Carter’s outrage at the prospect of codification 
would have been hollow if the common law was itself characterized by 
soulless logical reasoning.  He had to explain how the common law, unlike a 
code system, provided case-specific justice.  In doing so, Carter painted a most 
un-Langdellian portrait of the manner in which common law judges decided 
cases. 
 
V.  CARTER’S UN-LANGDELLIAN COMMON LAW METHODOLOGY 
Both Langdell and Carter recognized that deducing the solution to specific 
cases from general rules was sometimes incompatible with justice.  They 
responded to this tension in opposite ways, however.  Langdell, in Thomas 
Grey’s terms, permitted “acceptability . . . to influence decision only subject to 
the constraint of universally formal conceptual order.”147 Carter, by contrast, 
in a reversal of this formula, believed that formal conceptual order should 
affect the resolution of particular cases only subject to the constraint of 
acceptability.   
 
jurisprudential imperialist who intended to totally uproot the common law.  CARTER,
ORIGIN, GROWTH & FUNCTION, supra note 40, at 308-10. 
146 If the New York legislature had adopted Field’s code, New York courts would in 
fact have had more trouble than California courts concluding that the derogation principle 
should guide code interpretation.  As noted above, while both the California Civil Code and 
Field’s New York draft contained explicit rejections of the derogation principle, the 
California version, unlike the New York one, counterbalanced this provision with another 
declaring, “The provisions of this Code, so far as they are substantially the same as . . . the 
common law, must be construed as continuations thereof, and not as new enactments.”  See 
supra note 128. 
147 Grey, supra note 4, at 15.  The same could be said of Langdell’s classical disciple 
on the Harvard faculty, Samuel Williston.  Williston observed, “[I]n trying to do justice 
between parties to a litigation . . . the law may suffer in consequence of a distinction whose 
only validity is that in the case before the court, justice happens to be with one party.” 
SAMUEL J. WILLISTON, SOME MODERN TENDENCIES IN THE LAW 85 (1986).  Williston, 
however, expressed more ambivalence than Langdell about the desirability of sacrificing 
equity for formal order.  He remarked, “[L]ogic is likely to be followed at least to the point 
that it produces practically undesirable results.  Sometimes certainly it has been followed 
beyond this point.”  Id. at 155. 
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Impelled by his opposition to codification, Carter thus articulated a vision 
of the common law that is difficult to characterize as classical at all.  In Grey’s 
terms, “[T]he heart of classical theory was its aspiration that the legal system 
be made complete through universal formality, and universally formal through 
conceptual order.”148 Carter certainly viewed the common law as a complete 
legal system, that is, one that provided a correct solution for each and every 
case.  In his mind, however, neither conceptual order nor formal reasoning was 
a significant factor in the common law’s completeness.  Allusions to the 
conceptual and formal aspects of the common law occasionally appeared in 
Carter’s writings, just as references to justice sometimes showed up in 
Langdell’s.  But for Carter, conceptual and formal considerations were never 
especially important and were always strictly subsidiary to the goal of 
resolving each case equitably.  Carter was not an amoral classicist, or even a 
moral classicist, but a nonclassical moralist.  
Carter’s portrait of common law decision making is, in critical respects, 
one that most modern scholars would not associate with Gilded Age jurists.  It 
is, instead, reminiscent of the legal realists who rebelled against Langdell’s 
legacy in the twentieth century.  When reading the following examination of 
Carter’s common law method, it is interesting to keep in mind that many 
aspects of his approach—his anticonceptualism, his antiformalism and rule 
skepticism, his restrictive approach to stare decisis, his belief in the 
importance of extralegal sources—anticipated trends usually thought not to 
have flowered in the United States until after his death.  Later in this article, I 
will address in detail the similarities between Carter and these later jurists. 
 
A.  Carter’s Rejection of Conceptualist Formalism 
Thomas Grey explains, “A legal system is conceptually ordered to the 
extent that its substantive bottom-level rules can be derived from a small 
number of relatively abstract principles and concepts, which themselves form 
a coherent system.”149 By this definition, Carter’s common law was an almost 
entirely nonconceptualist system. 
Carter sometimes paid lip service to the benefits of systematic order in law.  
For example, even as he rejected codification, he acknowledged: “A book 
containing a statement in the manner of a Digest, and in analytical and 
systematic form of the whole unwritten law, expressed in accurate, scientific 
language, is indeed a thing which the legal profession has yearned after. . .  It 
would refresh the failing memory, reproduce in the mind its forgotten 
acquisitions, exhibit the body of the law, so as to enable a view to be had of 
the whole, and of the relation of the several parts.”150 On another occasion, 
Carter observed that “whoever aspires to be a thoroughly accomplished 
 
148 Grey, supra note 4, at 11. 
149 Id. at 8. 
150 CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 39, at 96-97. 
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lawyer” must “comprehend [legal] rules as parts of a classified and orderly 
system exhibiting the law as a science.”151 
However, Carter never viewed the systematic presentation of law as more 
than a somewhat useful mneumonic device and research aid for practicing 
lawyers.  He did not believe that a desire for conceptual order had shaped the 
common law in the past, and he vigorously rejected any attempt to allow such 
an aspiration to guide its development in the future.  He sneered at English 
codifiers, like Jeremy Bentham, John Austin, and James Fitzjames Stephen, 
for complaining that the common law was “destitute of system.”152 
Their views . . . are the views of professors of law, whose lives are devoted, not 
like those of lawyers and judges, to the practical administration of law, but to 
teaching it, and lecturing about it. . . .  The defect thus suggested is, in a 
practical point of view, of but a moderate degree of importance.  If justice is, in 
fact, in any nation well administered, if the affairs of men are regulated by a 
wise and cultivated body of legal rules, and if these can be learned by the 
professional class with such certainty as to enable it to furnish trustworthy 
advice and guidance, the mere circumstance that such rules cannot be found set 
down in words and arranged in orderly and systematic form, is not, of itself, a 
very serious matter.153 
Carter rejected the notion that rules of decision were logically deduced from a 
coherent system of abstract principles.  He mocked Bentham for “imagin[ing] 
that a system of law could be created per saltum by spinning out through 
purely logical processes the consequences of a series of original intellectual 
conceptions.”154 
The lack of conceptualism in Carter’s common law jurisprudence emerges 
clearly from his descriptions of how courts resolved cases for which there was 
no direct precedent.  Classicists suggested that judges addressed such 
situations by determining the appropriate top-level general principle and then 
deductively deriving a lower-level rule for the case at hand from that principle.  
In 1891, Ezra Thayer (who would later become Dean of Harvard Law School) 
described the process as follows: 
 
If the present facts do not directly fall within any case, or any hard-and-fast rule 
already settled, the first inquiry of the judge is for decided cases similar to this.  
Instances are produced, each showing the law on a particular state of facts, and 
presenting an analogy to the case in hand more or less direct.  These cases are 
scrutinized, classified, distinguished; the wider principles which they illustrate, 
and which are claimed by the contending parties to include the present case, are 
 
151 CARTER, ORIGIN, GROWTH & FUNCTION, supra note 40, at 1. 
152 CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 39, at 71. 
153 Id. at 72-73. 
154 Id. at 70. 
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determined and tested by a comparison with other branches of the law; and thus 
a decision is finally reached.155 
Thayer thought that this entire process—both the “extraction” of the 
broader principle from the precedents and the correct resolution of the case at 
hand by deduction from that principle—were formal and nondiscretionary.  “It 
is true that with a new state of facts it is in a sense impossible to say, under our 
system, that the law exists before the case is decided.  Yet if principles exist 
which make it certain how the case will be decided, it is the same, from a 
practical point of view, as if the law previously existed.”156 
Carter occasionally described the common law method for deciding new 
cases in a way that, on the surface, seemed somewhat similar to the classical 
approach.  For example, he wrote: “Judges and advocates—all together—
engage in the search. Cases more or less nearly approaching the one in 
controversy are adduced.  Analogies are referred to.  The custom and habits of 
men are appealed to.  Principles already settled as fundamental are invoked 
and run out to their consequences; and finally a rule is deduced which is 
declared to be the one which the existing law requires to be applied to the 
case.”157 
Carter’s references to “rules” and “analogies” and “deduction” give a 
formal veneer to this passage, the most classical account of common law 
decision making he ever articulated.  But even here, his allusion to “customs 
and habits” hints at the profound difference between his approach and that of 
Langdell, who denied considerations of “acceptability” any determinative 
force in the lower levels of his system.  Indeed, immediately following this 
passage, Carter elaborated on his description in a way that further manifested 
the contrast between him and the classicists.  
 
In all this, the things which are plain and palpable are, (1) that the whole 
process consists in a search to find a rule; (2) that the rule thus sought for is the 
just rule—that is to say, the rule most in accordance with the sense of justice of 
those engaged in the search; (3) that it is tacitly assumed that the sense of 
justice is the same in all those who are thus engaged—that is to say, that they 
have a common standard of justice from which they can argue with, and 
endeavor to persuade each other; (4) that the field of search is the habits, 
customs, business and manners of the people, and those previously declared 
rules which have sprung out of previous similar inquiries into habits, customs, 
business and manners.158 
155 Ezra R. Thayer, Judicial Legislation: Its Legitimate Function in the Development of 
the Common Law, 5 HARV. L. REV. 172, 182 (1891). 
156 Id. at 181 n. 2.  Thayer repeatedly uses the word “extract” to describe the first stage 
of the process.  Id. at 182-84. 
157 Carter, Ideal and Actual, supra note 44, at 224. 
158 Id.
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As Thomas Grey observes, Langdell excluded fairness concerns from the 
lower levels of his system because “to let considerations of acceptability 
directly justify a bottom-level rule or individual decision would violate the 
requirement of conceptual order, on which the universal formality and 
completeness of the system depended.”159 By contrast, Carter welcomed 
direct considerations of the customary standard of justice into the lower levels 
of his system—conceptual order be damned.  
Carter often seemed to omit higher-level abstract concepts from his 
common law jurisprudence altogether.  In the classical orthodox approach, 
there were relatively few general principles (concepts such as consideration in 
contract and proximate cause in tort), but they were numerous enough to form 
a coherent system unto themselves and occupy law students for three full 
years.160 Carter, by contrast, reasoned down from just one broad principle: be 
fair.  In his own words, “Apart from, and independent of, known facts, there is 
no such thing, in human apprehension, as law, except the broad and empty 
generalization that justice must be done.”161 
The classicist Ezra Thayer identified Carter’s neglect of principles and 
rules as the chief flaw in his jurisprudence.  After criticizing Bentham for 
focusing only on abstract rules and overlooking their application to facts, 
Thayer continued: 
 
Some of [Bentham’s] opponents, on the other hand, lay hold of what may be 
called the fact end of the process, the end which is especially emphasized by 
common-law methods, and forget the rule. . . .  Mr. Carter . . .  seems especially 
open to this charge of considering only the facts on the one hand and the source 
of law [that is, custom] on the other, and of squeezing out, so to speak, the 
tertium quid, the rule itself, which lies between.162 
The difference in how Carter and Langdell discussed the one legal problem 
they both addressed at some length exemplifies the contrast between them.  
Under the common law, a minor (an “infant” in legal parlance) lacks capacity 
to contract, and any contract he enters into is therefore voidable.  In other 
words, if an individual enters into a contract with a minor and then sues under 
the contract, the minor can successfully defend himself by pleading the 
defense of infancy.  What is the correct result, however, if the defendant, out 
of the goodness of his heart, reaffirms his contractual obligation after he 
reaches the age of majority and is then sued under the contract?  In general, 
promises made without consideration are not actionable.  Nevertheless, since 
1586, the common law has treated such ratified infant contracts as binding.163 
Langdell’s and Carter’s explanations for this result were strikingly different. 
 
159 Grey, supra note 4, at 15. 
160 See id. at 9 (identifying consideration and proximate cause as classical concepts). 
161 CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 39, at 26. 
162 Thayer, supra note 160, at 198. 
163 Edmonds v. Barton, 3 Leon. 164, 74 Eng. Rep. 608 (K.B. 1586). 
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Langdell derived almost all of contract law from the principle of bargained-
for consideration.  Consequently, he embraced the common law’s 
longstanding view that a promise is not binding if the promisor is simply 
affirming the existence of a moral obligation to perform.164 In such an 
instance, even if the promisee previously provided the promisor with 
something of value, no contract exists because the current (renewed) promise 
did not induce the consideration.165 Langdell criticized the contrary position, 
adopted by the great English jurist Lord Mansfield. 
 
Whether [Mansfield’s] theory was that the antecedent moral obligation 
furnished a sufficient consideration for the promise, or that such a promise was 
binding without a consideration, may not be clear; but the former theory is the 
one that has commonly been attributed to him, and hence the moral obligation 
which was supposed to make the promise binding has acquired the name of 
moral consideration.  The other theory, however, would have been less 
untenable, and less mischievous in its tendency.  It would indeed have been 
liable to the serious objection of involving judicial legislation, but the theory of 
moral consideration was liable to the much greater objection, at least in a 
scientific point of view, that it could only succeed at the expense of involving a 
fundamental legal doctrine in infinite confusion.166 
In Langdell’s eyes, Mansfield was not only wrong, but wrong in a way that 
undermined the conceptual order of the common law of contracts.   
Still, Langdell had to confront the inconvenient fact that courts, in 
Mansfield’s time and since, actually did enforce various types of gratuitous 
promises to do what the promisor was already under a moral obligation to 
do—including, for example, promises to pay debts contracted during 
infancy.167 Langdell struggled to justify the courts’ recognition of ratified 
infant contracts in a manner consistent with his scientific approach.  In other 
words, he sought to explain the doctrine in a way that neither violated the 
principle of bargained-for consideration nor depended on the courts’ moral 
judgment.  He arrived at the following rationalization: “The contract of an 
infant, not being void, but merely voidable, can be ratified by the infant after 
he comes of age, and a new promise operates as a ratification.  The action, 
however, must be brought on the original contract, and the new promise must 
be used simply to repel the defence of infancy in the event of its being 
pleaded.”168 Langdell thus unpersuasively suggested that the upholding of 
 
164 LANGDELL, supra note 66, at 89-90. 
165 See Val D. Ricks, The Sophisticated Doctrine of Consideration, 9 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 99, 118-21 (2000). 
166 LANGDELL, supra note 66, at 89. 
167 Other examples provided by Mansfield and noted by Langdell were promises to pay 
debts barred by the statute of limitations and promises by bankrupt individuals to pay debts 
from which they had been discharged.  Id. 
168 Id. at 91. 
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ratified infant contracts was the inexorable result of logical deduction from 
higher principles. 
Carter, by contrast, felt no impulse to force this problem into a conceptual 
scheme.  It is worth quoting Carter’s analysis at length to highlight the 
difference between him and Langdell. 
 
What did the judge do to whom the case was first submitted of a contract made 
by an infant and ratified after he became of age?  He observed that it was an 
infant’s contract, and therefore at first it seemed assignable to [that] excepted 
class; but he noticed the new feature of ratification after full age.  He recurred 
to the instances which made up the class of infants’ contracts.  He found that 
none of them exhibited this feature.  He then inquired whether that feature was 
a material one; that is to say, whether the case ought to go into the same class 
with the others, or into a new class to be made for it with different legal 
consequences for its characteristic.  In this inquiry the action of his 
predecessors supplied him with no controlling guide.  He was obliged to 
determine for himself.  And what was the real problem which he had to solve?  
Simply this: what does justice require?  He was to apply to this case the social 
standard of justice; not simply to repeat what had been done before, but to 
make an original application of it.  He was not, however, without aids which 
his existing knowledge supplied.  He found indeed that there was no new 
consideration for the ratification; but he also found that, in prior cases, the 
courts had enforced promises in the nature of ratification.  He found that the 
original consideration was perfect, and the subsequent ratification sufficient 
evidence that the original contract was not tainted with any unfairness or 
imposition.  Justice, as he understood it (and his understanding presumably 
represented that of the society in which he lived), required that this contract 
should be performed; in other words, that a new class be made for such 
cases.169 
In this passage, Carter makes nods to formal reasoning, and even conceptual 
reasoning, but these elements ultimately bend to the needs of justice—not, as 
for Langdell, the other way around. 
 
B. “Rules Are Made For Fools” 
Carter often traveled overseas with John Cadwalader, a prominent New 
York City lawyer and perhaps his closest friend.  On one such occasion, when 
they were vacationing together at a hunting lodge in Scotland, Cadwalader 
wrote a letter home in which he remarked, “Carter says—who plays Bridge 
according to his own rules—that Rules were made for fools.”170 
169 CARTER, PROVINCES, supra note 39, at 26-27. 
170 Letter from Cadwalader to S. Weir Mitchell (Sept. 28, 1902?) (College of 
Physicians of Philadelphia, S. Weir Mitchell Papers, Box 6, Item # 14). 
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In law, as in card games.  Carter frequently exhibited a striking degree of 
skepticism about legal rules.  In other words, he rejected not only conceptualist 
formalism, but even nonconceptualist formalism.  A legal system does not 
have to conceptualist to be formal.  A jurist may embrace concrete bottom-
level rules without demanding that they be derived from a coherent system of 
higher level principles.  As Thomas Grey remarks, “Non-conceptualist 
formalism is a common attitude among lawyers; they want clear rules, but 
place little importance on more abstract doctrinal formulations.”171 Carter, 
however, often seemed to deny the very possibility of determinate legal rules.  
As discussed above, Carter argued that the main problem with codification 
was the injustice that inevitably resulted when courts applied general rules to 
particular circumstances.  Carter sometimes followed this line of reasoning to 
its ultimate conclusion—a rejection of legal rules themselves.  
 
It is of the essence of a . . . rule that it creates, or supposes, a class of instances 
to which it is to be applied.  The class may be narrowly and cautiously limited; 
but within its scope it embraces future and unknown, as well as present and 
known cases.  The essential nature of classification consists of selecting 
qualities of objects, and declaring that all which possess such qualities, 
whatever others they may exhibit, belong to the class.  When, therefore, any 
case arises for disposition under a Code, if it present the features belonging to a 
class created by it, it must be dealt with the same as other instances in that 
class, no matter what additional and theretofore unknown features it may 
present, which ought to subject, and would have subjected, it to a wholly 
different disposition, had the new features been present to the mind of the 
codifier. . . .  No rule whatever can be framed which will not do this.172 
Carter maintained that the common law was superior to a code system 
precisely because it could resolve every matter equitably, in light of the 
particular facts.  Because the very notion of a rule implies some degree of 
generalization, Carter sometimes depicted the common law as avoiding rules 
altogether.   
It was difficult, however, for Carter to square his rule skepticism with the 
common law doctrine of stare decisis.  After all, the vast body of judicial 
precedents set forth innumerable bottom-level rules that supposedly provided 
an uncontroversial basis for resolving many cases.  If a judge hearing a matter 
found a prior case with essentially identical facts, stare decisis ordinarily 
demanded that he decide the case at hand the same way.  Carter, a successful 
practitioner, recognized the power of precedent.  Indeed, at times, he discussed 
the role of precedent in a manner that made him sound like a rule-bound 
formalist. 
 
171 Grey, supra note 4, at 9 n. 29. 
172 CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 39, at 31-32. 
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[A] large number of [judgments] declare that the particular transactions 
described are like, or substantially like, some other transactions which had 
previously engaged the attention of the courts and had been decided in a 
particular way, and the like decision is therefore made in the particular case 
under consideration; in other words, the case is decided by an appeal to known 
precedent, or to known precedents. . . .  The operation . . . of the tribunals has 
consisted simply in scrutinising the features of the transactions and placing 
them in some already determined class in which they belonged, the judgment 
pronounced being nothing but the legal consequence of the fact that they 
belonged to a particular class.173 
Carter acknowledged that the doctrine of stare decisis sometimes denied 
common law judges the flexibility they needed to keep the law in line with 
changing social norms.  Indeed, he maintained that legislation was warranted 
in such situations.  “[S]ociety in its progress and development outgrows its old 
usages and essays to form new ones.  The uniformity and persistency at which 
the judicial office always aims, become a barrier to this development; and the 
need is felt of an agency less fettered by precedent and clothed with a power 
somewhat resembling the creative function.  It is the office of legislation to 
supply this need.”174 
Nevertheless, if Carter had adopted a strict version of stare decisis, he 
would have undermined his own primary argument for the superiority of the 
common law over a code—namely, that the former, unlike the latter, was 
capable of resolving each case according to the dictates of justice.  The 
common law’s embrace of binding precedent potentially made it just as 
vulnerable as a code to the charge of sacrificing fairness for certainty.  Field 
and his allies frequently made precisely this assertion.  Field pointed out that 
“the Courts have not greater liberty to decide right without a code than with it.  
The rules which govern the Judges in their decisions are contained in 
precedents.”175 To emphasize the contrast between the common law and 
codification, Carter thus had to downplay the significance of stare decisis.   
Consequently, Carter whittled away the doctrine into insignificance.  First, 
he argued that the only relevant data emerging from a precedent were the facts 
and the result. 
 
The judge never undertakes to decide anything more than the precise case 
brought before him for judgment.  He considers the facts of that case, and . . .  
 
173 CARTER, ORIGIN, GROWTH & FUNCTION, supra note 40, at 68-69. 
174 Carter, Ideal and Actual, supra note 40, at 232.  
175 Letter from David Dudley Field to the California Bar, in 1 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS,
AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 354 (A. P. Sprague ed., 1884).  
Robert Fowler similarly argued: “Another great objection to case-law is that the vast 
agglomeration of decisions tends to make the law one of precedent and not one of principle; 
judges and lawyers are so overwhelmed and confounded by the array of authority that in 
desperation they shield themselves behind some ill-considered precedent without regard to 
substantial justice in the given case.  FOWLER, supra note 83, at 49. 
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he pronounces judgment, and there stops.  He does not even declare, at least not 
as a necessary part of his function, what the law is.  He is not bound to write an 
opinion.  He usually does write one, stating his views upon the legal questions.  
But this is of no binding force.  The strictest doctrine of stare decisis requires 
subordinate tribunals to follow, not the opinion, but the judgment; and the 
obligation is of no force in a future case presenting materially different aspects.  
If the court in its opinion lays down rules in general terms which might 
embrace cases differing from the one decided, such declaration of rules is 
provisional only, and subject to modification in any future case presenting 
materially different features.176 
As Carter noted in the last sentence of this quotation, a common law judge 
is not bound by a precedent if the case at hand presents facts “materially 
different” from the prior decision.  The second critical feature of Carter’s 
effort to cabin stare decisis was his embrace of an extremely liberal view of 
what constituted “material” distinctions.  In his eyes, virtually every case 
heard by a court was a “new” case.  He recognized that the “great mass of the 
transactions of life are . . . repetitions of what has before happened—not exact 
repetitions, for such never occur—but repetitions of all substantial features.”  
But such transactions rarely generated legal disputes, because “they have once 
or oftener been subjected to judicial scrutiny and the rules which govern them 
are [therefore] known.  They arise and pass away without engaging the 
attention of lawyers or the courts.”  Those cases that reached a courtroom 
were, for the most part, “exceptional” cases.  “The great bulk of . . .  litigation 
springs out of transactions which present material features never before 
exhibited, or new combinations and groupings of facts.”177 
Carter emphasized that the “infinite number of diversities” in human affairs 
generated countless new questions of fairness.  “In the State of New York, 
each successive day witnesses acts, millions in number, each one of which 
may, by possibility, become the source of dispute, and call for judicial 
decision, and no two of them be alike!”178 And because society constantly 
evolved, there would never be a shortage of fresh problems for courts to 
address.  “The notion that society ever has reached, or ever will reach, a state 
of equilibrium and rest, so that the transactions of tomorrow will be mere 
repetitions in substance of the transactions of to-day [sic] is a vain illusion.  
There is no part of the universe which is not forever under the dominion of 
change, and no where [sic] does it proceed with such activity as in the realm of 
man.”179 
If virtually all cases heard by the courts exhibited novel material features, 
the significance of stare decisis was limited indeed.  Carter asserted that a 
judge hoping to decide a case solely by reference to reported precedents would 
 
176 CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 39, at 27. 
177 CARTER, PROVINCES, supra note 39, at 34-35; Carter, Ideal and Actual, supra note 
40, at 227 (“exceptional cases”). 
178 CARTER, PROVINCES, supra note 39, at 36. 
179 Id.
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almost always discover that “there is no rule truly ‘known’ which governs 
it.”180 The rules pronounced by judges in prior cases “are to be taken in 
reference to the facts which have elicited the opinions . . . and whenever a case 
arises presenting different aspects, the rule is subject to modification and 
adaptation as justice or expediency may dictate.”181 
Carter viewed justice as so fact-specific that at times he seemed to 
challenge the very notion of framing legal rules in advance.  He virtually 
sneered at the “vast body of so-called rules found in our digests and treatises 
and mentioned in the reports of decided cases. . . .  None of them are absolute.  
They are all provisional and subject to modification.”182 He declared: “The 
fact must always come before the law. Apart from known, existing facts, 
present to the mind of the judge . . . he cannot even ask, and still less answer, 
the question, what is the law? . . .  [P]rivate law does not consist in a series of 
logical deductions drawn from original definitions and capable of existing 
independently of the material, or moral world.”183 Carter pithily summed up 
his rule skepticism as follows: “all just law . . . can have, in human 
apprehension, no existence apart from the facts.”184 
It bears repeating that Carter did not deny that judicial precedents were 
relevant to common law decision making.  They provided analogies and 
helped guide the court’s inquiry.  In Carter’s words, the judge’s task was “to 
apply the existing standard of justice to the new exhibition of fact, and to do 
this by ascertaining the conclusion to which right reason, aided by rules 
already established, leads.”185 Carter’s antiformalism lay in his conviction that 
precedents, though useful, did not ordinarily provide an indisputable rule of 
decision for the case at hand.  He explained: 
 
It is not that no rule is known which is applicable to the transaction; there may 
be many which have a bearing on it.  Several different rules—all just in their 
proper sphere—are competing with each other for supremacy.  The question is 
not whether the rules are right or wrong; they may all be right; but which must 
give way to the other; or whether a modified and partial operation must not be 
given to all, or some.  It would be a fatal error to force upon such transactions a 
rule which had arisen out of different ones.  It would be sacrificing justice for 
the sake of uniformity, whereas diversity is everywhere the characteristic of 
justice.186 
180 CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 39, at 29. 
181 Id. at 25-26. 
182 CARTER, ORIGIN, GROWTH & FUNCTION, supra note 40, at 233. 
183 CARTER, PROVINCES, supra note 39, at 28. 
184 CODIFICATION, supra note 39, at 32. 
185 Id. at 29-30. 
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This discussion anticipated, by almost half a century, legal realist Walter 
Wheeler Cook’s well-known assertion that “legal principles—and rules as 
well—are in the habit of hunting in pairs.”187 
C.  The Question of Certainty 
Carter’s depiction of the common law seemed to sacrifice certainty for the 
sake of fairness.  This was a risky strategy, for the uncertainty of the common 
law was one of the main themes of codification proponents.  According to 
code advocates, this uncertainty was caused primarily by the obscurity of 
common law reasoning and the uncontrolled proliferation of precedents.188 
Carter’s contention that the fact-specific common law did not establish clear 
rules in advance of actual disputes provided his opponents yet another basis 
for maintaining that the existing system was too uncertain.  Robert Fowler, for 
example, acknowledged that the common law might more flexibly resolve 
problems raised by peculiar constellations of facts, but he denied that 
codification “increases the proportion of injustice in the given case . . . to such 
an extent as to outweigh the benefits to be derived from the added certainty 
and the compactness of expression found in a code.”189 
Carter did not view the issue of certainty as a vulnerability, however.  First, 
he argued that regardless of codification’s effect on certainty, the “necessity of 
enforcing justice in particular instances . . . is imperative, and can be 
subordinated to no other object.”190 Then he went further, attacking the 
codifiers’ premise that statutory law offered greater certainty than the common 
law.  Indeed, he confidently asserted that the common law was more certain 
than a codified system. 
Carter did not hold up the common law as an absolute guarantor of legal 
certainty.  Rather, he asserted that uncertainty was unavoidable in any legal 
system because it “proceeds from causes quite beyond human control.”191 It 
was not “the fault of lawyers or judges, or of the system of our jurisprudence” 
but rather “inherent in the order of nature.”192 Uncertainty was inevitable 
because the endless emergence of unique factual circumstances constantly 
raised new ethical problems.  “It should [be] remembered, that the questions 
with which the law deals, and consequently the law itself, are incessantly 
changing.  Most of the uncertainty and doubt does not arise in consequence of 
any failure to settle old questions, but from the perpetual birth of new points of 
 
187 Walter Wheeler Cook, Book Review, 38 YALE L. J. 405, 406 (1929).  For a further 
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controversy.”193 Carter urged his readers not only to acknowledge this 
uncertainty, but to embrace it. 
 
Nor is this uncertainty to be deprecated.  It is rather to be welcomed, met, and 
surmounted.  It is the discipline of human nature.  It furnishes the conditions 
upon which moral and intellectual progress are made.  “Progress is the child of 
struggle, and struggle is the child of difficulty.”  What would become of 
science, reason, and morals, if new problems were not incessantly presenting 
themselves for solution.  What progress would be possible in law, if justice 
could be frozen into a rigid body of unchangeable rules?194 
Carter readily acknowledged that under the common law, the answer to 
novel questions was sometimes unclear to the citizenry until judges, the 
experts on the application of the social standard of justice, resolved them.  
Nevertheless, the common law provided the people with a solid ground of day-
to-day certainty, because it was based on their own customary morality.  They 
could conduct their affairs with “ordinary prudence . . . in the full confidence 
that the rules of law which govern their transactions, should they ever be 
challenged, would be the simple dictates of justice and common sense 
intelligently ascertained and applied.”195 
In a code system, by contrast, courts’ decisions were based not on the 
social standard of justice, but on the words of a statute.  Carter argued, first, 
that this approach engendered uncertainty because “human language is, at best, 
so inaccurate an instrument, there being often numerous different senses in 
which the same word is understood that there are, and always will be, a 
multitude of doubts concerning the meaning of the best drawn statutes.”196 An 
even more important cause of uncertainty in a code system, according to 
Carter, was the irresistible tendency of law to conform to the social standard of 
justice, even in the face of unambiguously contrary statutory language.  
 
Whenever a statute is found to work injustice in consequence of the failure of 
its framers to suitably provide for cases which they could not foresee, an 
opposition arises against the operation of the law.  If the injustice be gross, the 
moral sense is shocked. . . .  The courts recoil from the office of enforcing the 
law.  Doubts are entertained concerning the meaning of the statute.  The plain 
sense of the words is insisted upon by one side, the improbability that such 
injustice could have been intended, by the other.  The difficulty is usually 
resolved by the employment of the subtle arts of interpretation, and the obvious 
meaning of the language is expounded away in the favor of the interests of 
justice.  Who does not know that of all the manifold sources of uncertainty in 
law none is so fruitful as the attempt to apply a statute to a case falling within 
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its terms, but which, not having been foreseen by its framers, does not fall 
within its spirit?197 
In short, Carter asserted that the common law’s embodiment of customary 
morality did not make it less certain than a codified system.  To the contrary, 
the common law’s reflection of the social standard of justice was the very 
source of its superiority in this respect.  
 
D.  Law Outside the Books 
Carter’s conviction that justice (“acceptability” in Thomas Grey’s terms) 
should be the ultimate determinant of every case required not only that he 
relegate, and sometimes entirely reject, classical ideals such as conceptualism 
and formalism, but also that he embrace a very un-Langdellian view of the 
sources of law.  Langdell asserted that “law is a science, and . . . all the 
available materials of that science are contained in printed books.”  For the 
Harvard dean, the common law decisions stored in the law library were “the 
ultimate sources of all legal knowledge.”198 Carter, by contrast, did not 
believe that law could autonomously generate a correct solution to every case.  
He thus recognized, at least by the end of his career, that judges often had to 
look outside the law books.  
Interestingly, Carter initially seemed to embrace what legal realist Jerome 
Frank would later (in reference to Langdell) deride as “library law.”199 
Carter’s early attitude may have been related to his role as the first president of 
the Harvard Law School Association, the institution’s alumni organization.  
Langdell’s innovative case method, premised on the theory that the common 
law was a self-sufficient coherent system, was a great point of pride for the 
school.200 At the Association’s first meeting, in 1886, Carter delivered an 
address in which he praised the case method and thus articulated a book-
centered vision of law. 
 
I think that the methods that are now pursued, so far as I understand them, are a 
vast improvement over those with which I was acquainted when I was a 
member of the School.  What is it that students go to a law school to learn? . . . 
What is this thing which we call “law,” and with the administration of which 
we have to deal?  Where is it found? . . .  It is found, and it is alone found, in 
those adjudications, those judgments, which from time to time its ministers and 
its magistrates are called upon to make in determining the actual rights of men. 
. . . The purpose of [the case method] is to study the great and principal cases 
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in which are the real sources of the law, and to extract from them the rule 
which, when discovered, is found to be superior to all cases.201 
How did Carter reconcile his assertion that law was found only in reported 
cases with his belief that judges resolved cases according to the social standard 
of justice?  Ultimately, he could not do so, but it took him a while to recognize 
the tension.  In The Provinces of the Written and the Unwritten Law (1889), 
Carter maintained that by linking the law to the social standard of justice, he 
did “not, of course, mean to imply that the judge . . . makes any direct inquiry 
into public opinion.”  He continued: “The fabric of the national law is a vast 
system of rules which are the product of that opinion, gathered from time to 
time by the labors of his predecessors, aided by the skill and learning of a 
numerous professional body . . . .  It is here that the social standard of justice 
stands ascertained and declared; and the function of the judge is to apply it, as 
it has been applied before, or, when new questions arise, to determine them 
according to the analogies which the system reveals to him.”202
Even in this case-centered description of judicial decision making, Carter 
acknowledged, if only indirectly, that the common law was not entirely 
autonomous. After all, if judicial precedents reflected the social standard of 
justice, principles external to “law in the books” must have entered the 
common law system somehow.  In Provinces, Carter suggested that judicial 
decisions reflected the social standard of justice as an inevitable consequence 
of the fact that judges were “in close intercourse and sympathy with the mass 
of the people.”203 In other words, popular customs shaped the law even if 
judges looked only at case reports.  Carter explained that the social standard of 
justice “is ascertained and made effective by the judges, who know it and feel 
it because they are part of the community.”204 
The next year, Carter started explicitly to back away from his suggestion 
that the common law was simultaneously autonomous and a product of the 
social standard of justice.  As noted previously, in The Ideal and the Actual in 
the Law (1890), Carter asserted that the “field of search” in which judges 
looked for the law was “the habits, customs, business and manners of the 
people, and those previously declared rules which have sprung out of previous 
similar inquiries into habits, customs, business and manner.”205 Carter now 
apparently recognized that judges purposively examined not only law books, 
but also society itself. 
Near the end of the final lecture of Law: Its Origin, Growth, and Function 
(1907), his posthumously-published book, Carter revisited the topic of 
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Harvard Law School’s case method.  This time, he qualified his praise of the 
method in a way that illustrates how far he had traveled from Langdell’s 
“library law.”  Perhaps out of loyalty to his alma mater, which had offered to 
host the (never-delivered) series of lectures the book comprised, Carter 
acknowledged that Harvard’s case method was the “correct” approach for 
teaching law students.  But now, in stark contrast to his 1886 speech, and in 
terms that foreshadowed legal realism, he emphasized how little a purely case-
educated law school graduate really knew about law.  
 
These volumes [of reported cases] . . . are but a part of the great territory of fact 
which it is the business of the lawyer and jurist to explore.  Life itself is a 
moving spectacle of numberless forms of conduct the study of which is 
necessary to the full equipment of the lawyer or the judge. . . .  Herein we find 
the reason why lawyers of sound practical sense and knowledge of affairs so 
often acquit themselves both at the Bar and on the Bench better than others 
who may be much more accomplished in the learning of books.  They have 
been studying diligently and to good purpose the facts of human conduct as 
they are displayed in the great book of life.  The actual methods and systems of 
trade, commerce, and finance embrace great realms of fact in which legal 
principles lie implicit and disclose themselves to careful investigation.  All the 
actions of men . . . are the proper theme of the lawyer’s study.  And then too 
there is the internal world, the realm of consciousness, equally necessary to be 
studied and equally fruitful in results, for it is here that the secret springs, the 
real causes of all conduct are discerned.206 
Carter’s critique of the case method echoes in interesting ways his 
assessment of Langdell himself.  In 1869, when Harvard president Charles 
Eliot was considering appointing Langdell as the dean of the law school, he 
sought and received Carter’s opinion.  Carter, who had known Langdell since 
they attended college and law school together at Harvard, praised him as a 
“scholar of the first order.”  He then, however, remarked on Langdell’s limited 
success as a practitioner and ascribed it to Langdell’s idealistic refusal to soil 
himself with the muck of “the world as he found it.”  Carter observed that “if 
[Langdell] is wanting in any of the qualities, which you are seeking to secure, 
it will be found to be in aptitude of affairs and the skill and resources to deal 
with society and men as he finds them.”207 
Carter’s portrait of Langdell as a detached intellectual, ill-suited for 
practice, raises the question of whether Carter’s own jurisprudence was shaped 
in part by his long experience as a practicing lawyer.  As I will discuss later in 
this article,208 Carter’s career as a litigator may have instilled in him an 
anticonceptualist and antiformalist outlook on law that undergirded his 
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jurisprudential arguments against the Civil Code. Interestingly, the 
anticodification writings of other practicing attorneys show similar qualities. 
 
VI. ALBERT MATHEWS 
Albert Mathews was a lawyer who helped Carter organize the Association 
of the Bar of the City of New York in 1869.209 In 1881 (two years before 
Carter wrote his first anticodification pamphlet), Mathews prepared Thoughts 
on Codification of the Common Law, a tract that the ABCNY printed and 
circulated as part of its campaign against Field’s Civil Code.  In this piece, 
Mathews explored the sources and nature of the common law in order to 
explain its superiority to a code system.  In doing so, he, like Carter, drew a 
picture of the common law in which conceptual order was largely absent and 
formal reasoning was, at most, a minor feature. 
Mathews placed justice at the center of his jurisprudence.  He defined the 
unwritten law (that is, the common law) as “the recognized will of [a] 
community . . . based upon its notions of natural justice, good morals, and 
good policy.”210 Mathews’ chief argument against codification, like Carter’s, 
was that justice was too fact-specific to be embodied in generally applicable 
rules.  He, too, was concerned about the “single additional, or omitted 
circumstance” that might make the application of a rule unfair in a new 
case.211 
To attempt to create a code of laws out of abstract notions of justice . . .  would 
not be very likely to be successful.  It might be comparatively easy to lay down 
a few simple abstract rules, but so soon as the law-giver descended to 
particulars, in the absence of concrete facts to guide his judgment, the laws of 
his imaginary empire would be, necessarily, either tyrannical or abortive.  It 
seems to be a task beyond the wit of man to forsee [sic] what special cases may 
arise, or thus to provide for contingencies that he cannot anticipate.212 
Mathews, sounding strikingly like Carter, concluded that “when [a] rule is to 
be found only in the Procrustean Bed of a written Code, the letter of the statute 
must prevail over any fitting modification of that rule which unforeseen 
circumstances may come to require, and justice may be thus surely 
defeated.”213 
According to Mathews, the common law, in contrast to a codified system, 
could resolve each matter fairly.  It could “be adapted, by wise administration, 
to the exigencies of particular cases of conflict as they arise.”214 Mathews’ 
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stress on the “plastic” nature of the common law impelled him, like Carter, to 
narrow the doctrine of stare decisis into practical insignificance.  He argued 
that each precedent was “necessarily limited to the precise concatenation of 
facts. . . .  It is the duty of a court of justice to ascertain and apply [the 
unwritten law] so far only as respects the particular concrete combinations of 
facts properly presented to it requires. . . .  [I]t is no part of its province to 
formulate general rules, or even principles, beyond what the particular case 
before it demands.”215 
Mathews’ de-emphasis of the force of precedent also provided him with a 
response to the codifiers’ claim that the vast, unorganized body of common 
law cases was enormously burdensome for practicing lawyers.  He explained 
that he was untroubled by the accumulation of precedents because they 
themselves did not constitute the law.  “Cases are not principles; they are only 
valuable as illustrations.  If they are not beneficial no one is compelled to use 
them; and, whoever wastes his time on them, may blame none but himself.”216 
Mathews vigorously denied that common law judges “made” law.217 He 
did not, however, devote much effort to explaining where judges “found” the 
law, if they did not make it.  Mathews clearly did not believe that courts used 
inexorable logical deduction to decide cases, for he did not think the common 
law was characterized by formal conceptual order.  Indeed, he expressly 
denied that the common law was “an exact science.”218 Nor did Mathews 
assert, as Carter would, that the “social standard of justice” or “custom” 
provided the objectively correct answer for every case.  Ultimately, Mathews’ 
answer to the code proponents’ charges of common law judicial lawmaking 
boiled down to a meek, “You, too.”  He argued, “Whether formulated by a 
Code, or illustrated by a precedent, such rules must still be applied to cases as 
they arise, according to judicial ‘notions of reason and justice.’”219 Mathews 
would leave it to Carter to construct a detailed theory as to how common law 
decision making could be both nondiscretionary and invariably fair.  
 
VII. R. FLOYD CLARKE 
In 1898, another New York practitioner, R. Floyd Clarke, published a 
lengthy book titled The Science of Law and Lawmaking. This volume, written 
for laymen, was, in essence, an extended jurisprudential attack on 
codification.220 
215 Id. at 15. 
216 Id. at 22. 
217 Id. at 23-26. 
218 Id. at 21. 
219 Id. at 25. 
220 R. FLOYD CLARKE, THE SCIENCE OF LAW AND LAWMAKING: BEING AN 
INTRODUCTION TO LAW, A GENERAL VIEW OF ITS FORMS AND SUBSTANCE, AND A DISCUSSION 
OF THE QUESTION OF CODIFICATION (1898).  It is unclear why Clarke published such a book 
LANGDELL UPSIDE-DOWN 
 
46
Like Carter, Clarke maintained that justice should be the central value of 
law.  He contended that law “involves politics, political economy, and 
ethics.”221 Clarke also echoed Carter’s argument that codification would 
undermine the law’s moral basis.  He described code decision making as a 
process of deductive reasoning, from general rules to specific facts.  He 
explained: “Under the Code System the rule prescribed deals with something 
which is never found in actual life.  The Code rule deals with a certain 
combination of facts which never occurs solely, or alone, in the outside world.  
The Code rule deals, therefore, with an abstraction of the human mind, and not 
with the facts as they exist.”222 The problem with this type of reasoning, for 
Clarke as for Carter, was that it inevitably led to unjust decisions.  “Where . . . 
questions of equity or inequity arise, dependent upon different combinations of 
fact, it is not always easy to lay down beforehand a rule which will produce a 
correct decision of all the possible cases that may arise.”223 
Clarke, a strikingly mediocre thinker, tried awkwardly to impose an almost 
Langdellian language of logic over his justice-centered vision.  This attempt, 
unsurprisingly, dissolved into nonsense.  Clarke stressed that the common law 
approach was “inductive,” in contrast to the “deductive” reasoning that 
characterized a codified system.224 His characterization of the common law as 
inductive occasionally made some sense—for example, when he described 
how in some fields of law, “numerous decisions based on almost all possible 
particular combinations of material facts have established all the general 
principles governing such cases.”225 Nevertheless, despite Clarke’s use of 
logical terminology, his view of common law decision making differed 
significantly from Langdell’s.   
As explained by Thomas Grey, the first phase of Langdell’s reasoning 
process—the phase in which the jurist derived general principles from 
precedents—was inductive.226 But in Langdell’s system, the process of 
induction was followed by an equally rigorous process of deduction from these 
derived general principles to lower-level rules of law and, finally, from these 
rules of law to the decisions of individual cases.227 Langdell was committed to 
the logical integrity of these later, deductive steps, and he thus preferred 
inequitable results in particular matters to fair decisions inconsistent with 
higher principles and rules.   
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For Clarke, by contrast, the just resolution of every matter was the 
motivating force of the common law.  “[T]he Court attempts to arrive at a fair 
and just result in the particular case.”228 Consequently, Clarke excluded rigid 
deduction from his portrait altogether and attempted to describe the entire 
common law decision-making process as inductive.  “The first and most 
important investigation is into the facts of the particular case—facts which 
have already happened and are now presented for observation and decision.  
Given the facts, the attempt is made to decide the case so that justice will 
result.”229 How did the judge make this decision?  “The decision necessarily 
involves the creation of some new general rule, or the acceptance of some old 
general rule underlying and involved in the facts of the case.  The enunciation 
of this reason for the decision, postulating as it does the existence and 
application of such general truth, is in itself a creation and prescription of such 
rule of conduct.”230 In other words, Clarke essentially argued that the case a 
judge was deciding was itself the source of the rule the judge used to decide 
it.231 
For Clarke, as for Carter, the driving principle behind every common law 
decision was “Let justice be done in this case.”232 And, as Ezra Thayer 
pointed out in criticizing Carter, this principle cannot be the basis for a 
coherent system of logically derived rules.  Indeed, Clarke explicitly 
downplayed the benefits of “formal organization.”  He acknowledged that 
codes were superior to the common law in this respect, but he continued: 
 
The advantage to be derived from scientific excellence in this particular may, 
however, be obtained at too great a cost. 
 For it must ever be borne in mind that the phenomena a system of justice 
deals with, are the special disputes among men; not the abstract conceptions of 
general principles.  The excellence of a system depends upon whether, in 
effect, justice is done between man and man.233 
Despite his muddled talk of induction and deduction, of rules and 
principles, Clarke ultimately manifested little concern for either conceptual 
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order or formality.  For him, as for Carter, these values were subsidiary to 
achieving an acceptable decision in each case.  Clarke made this point clear in 
summarizing the common law method of judging: “The great mass of existing 
rules and exceptions established by decided cases, and apparently affecting the 
decision to be made, are sifted and explained, limited and followed, with a 
view, upon the principles of logic, equity and political economy applicable, to 
make those apply which will produce the desired just result in the case at 
hand.”234 
Carter clung to the notion that common law decisions were 
nondiscretionary because judges derived them from a homogenous social 
standard of justice.  Clarke, writing two years before the turn of the century, 
took the modernist step of portraying the common law as almost entirely 
untethered.  He bluntly spoke of judges “creating” legal rules235 and freely 
described the common law as “judge-made law.”236 
The codification debate, more than any other issue of the late nineteenth 
century, forced practicing lawyers to grapple publicly with large 
jurisprudential questions.  The struggle against codification thus inspired an 
extraordinary flowering of literature in which attorneys defending the common 
law, such as Carter, Mathews, and Clarke, thoughtfully examined their role, 
and that of judges, in the existing legal system.  The resulting portrait of the 
common law painted by these lawyer-jurists was resoundingly different from 
that offered by Christopher Columbus Langdell.  Instead, the anticodifiers’ 
vision of the common law foreshadowed, by several decades, the views of the 
aggressively anti-Langdellian legal realists.   
 
VIII. CARTER AND LEGAL REALISM 
After World War I, the assault on legal classicism in general, and on 
Langdell in particular, was advanced by a group of scholars commonly known 
as the legal realists.237 The realists, who were particularly dominant at Yale 
and Columbia Law Schools, played a critical role in shaping legal academic 
discourse during the 1920s and 1930s.238 Although the realists largely ignored 
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Carter in their own writings, there were striking similarities between his 
jurisprudence and theirs.  The question of why the realists neglected Carter is 
an interesting and complex one that I have examined elsewhere.239 Here, I 
will limit my discussion to the ways in which Carter prefigured legal realism, 
regardless of the extent of actual influence he had over them.  
 
A.  Antiformalist Legal Reasoning 
 
Consider, for example, Carter’s and the realists’ respective views on the 
significance of legal rules.  The realists insisted on the indeterminacy of rules, 
at least in those cases where the law was unclear enough to warrant litigation 
and appeal.240 If the realists had paid attention to Carter, they would have 
realized that his work anticipated their own in this respect.  As explored above, 
a visceral resistance to generalization lay at the core of Carter’s jurisprudence.  
In his view, the application of general rules to concrete cases “does not 
embody justice; it is a mere jump in the dark; it is a violent framing of rules 
without reference to justice.”241 The fact that common law judges did not 
decide cases through the deductive application of rules was, Carter argued, the 
basis for the common law’s superiority to codified systems.   
Like Carter, the realists thought that deduction from general concepts and 
rules was an unwise and unjust method of decision making.  Laura Kalman 
explains: “The realists did not place their faith in the rules and concepts the 
conceptualists derived.  For these were formed by classifying disparate fact 
situations under the same rubric, and an opposition to the search for unity 
implicit in conceptualistic abstractions lay at the core of Legal Realism.”242 
Karl Llewellyn, a leading reaslist, declared that one central aspect of the realist 
creed was the “belief in the worthwhileness of grouping cases and legal 
situations into narrower categories than has been the practice in the past.  This 
is connected with the distrust of verbally simple rules—which so often cover 
dissimilar and non-simple fact situations.”243 
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The realists’ attitude toward the doctrine of stare decisis echoed Carter’s 
and reflected their similar fact-specific approach to legal reasoning.  As 
discussed above, Carter minimized the force of stare decisis in two ways: (1) 
by contending that the only relevant data contained in a precedent were the 
facts and the result, and (2) by claiming that most cases that reached litigation 
presented the court with materially distinguishable facts.244 Legal realist 
Herman Oliphant tried to cabin precedent in an almost equivalent manner.  In 
“A Return to Stare Decisis,” he argued that the only aspect of precedents that 
was “susceptible of sound and satisfying study” was “what courts have done in 
response to the stimuli of the facts of the concrete cases before them.”245 He 
observed that a precedent could be deemed to govern a very narrow range of 
fact situations, a very broad range, or any gradation between, depending on 
how tightly it was tied to its particular circumstances.  Like Carter, Oliphant 
wanted jurists to lean toward the pole of factual precision and thus to avoid 
excessive generalization in the application of precedents.246 
Oliphant perceived a lamentable historical trend in the opposite 
direction.247 Interestingly, however, he did not contend that the embrace of 
abstraction actually impelled courts to make unfair decisions.  Like Carter, he 
believed that common law judges, regardless of legal formalities, tended to 
resolve cases in accordance with their sense of justice. 
 
Judges are men, and men respond to human situations.  When the facts 
stimulating them to the action taken are studied from a particular and a current 
point of view, which our present classification prevents, we acquire a new faith 
in stare decisis.  From this viewpoint we see that courts are dominantly 
coerced, not by the essays of their predecessors, but by a surer thing, by an 
intuition of fitness of solution to problem, and a renewed confidence in judicial 
government is engendered.248 
Oliphant’s ultimate goal was not to prevent general propositions from deciding 
concrete cases, for, in his mind, courts rarely actually resolved matters in this 
way.  His true aim was to convince judges to embrace a “conscious and 
methodological empiricism” that would help them accomplish their practical 
ends.249 
Other realists had a similarly limited view of the importance of stare 
decisis. Llewellyn, for example, sounded quite like Carter when he expressed 
skepticism about the “rules” created by judicial precedents.  
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Every case lays down a rule, the rule of the case.  The express ratio decidendi is 
prima facie the rule of the case, since it is the group upon which the court chose 
to rest its decision.  But a later court can reexamine the case and can invoke the 
canon that no judge has power to decide what is not before him, can, through 
examination of the facts or the procedural issue, narrow the picture of what was 
actually before the court and can hold that the ruling made requires to be 
understood as thus restricted.  In the extreme form this results in what is known 
as expressly “confining the case to its particular facts.”  This rule holds only of 
redheaded Walpoles in pale magenta Buick cars.250 
Realists stressed not only the manipulability of the process by which courts 
drew rules from precedents, but also the indeterminacy of the process by 
which judges deductively applied these rules to new facts.  Realist literature 
emphasized the point that more than one rule was frequently available for the 
same fact situation.  Oliphant, for example, asserted, “The choice between the 
legal principles competing to control the new human situations involved in the 
cases we pass upon is not dictated by logic.”251 Llewellyn similarly argued 
that “in any case doubtful enough to make litigation respectable the available 
authoritative premises—i.e., premises legitimate and impeccable under the 
traditional legal techniques—are at least two, and . . . the two are mutually 
contradictory as applied to the case at hand.”252 Most memorably, Walter 
Wheeler Cook declared: “Legal principles—and rules as well—are in the habit 
of hunting in pairs.”253 
In modern scholarship, the realists of the 1920s and the 1930s receive most 
of the credit for developing these assaults on the logical pretensions of the 
classicists.  As noted above, however, Carter used almost identical language in 
1889 when he described the common law method for deciding new cases: “It 
is not that no rule is known which is applicable to the transaction; there may 
be many which have a bearing on it.  Several different rules—all just in their 
proper sphere—are competing with each other for supremacy.”254 
B.  Custom 
 
250 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 72 
(Oceana Publications 1960) (originally published 1930).  Llewellyn also emphasized how 
judges often used a “loose view” of precedent to take advantage of prior rulings that 
supported the result they were trying to reach.  Id. at 74.  The combination of these two 
techniques made it “possible to void the past mistakes of courts, and yet to make use of 
every happy insight for which a judge in writing may have found expression.”  Id. at 75. 
251 Oliphant, supra note 245, at 228. 
252 Llewellyn, supra note 243, at 1239. 
253 Cook, supra note 187, at 406. 
254 CARTER, PROVINCES, supra note 39, at 35.  See supra p. [   ]. 
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The oft-repeated adage that the legal realists believed “the law is 
determined by what the judge had for breakfast” is an absurd caricature.255 
The realists did not think court decisions were simply arbitrary.  After all, they 
viewed the legal scholar’s role as largely a predictive one, and the very 
possibility of prediction implies some degree of order and regularity.  The 
realists unanimously agreed, however, that formal rules and logical reasoning 
did not dictate legal results.  They therefore sought to identify explanations 
external to the law itself for judicial decisions.256 One of these explanations 
was custom.  Modern scholars disagree on just how central the notion of 
custom was to the realist jurisprudence of the 1920s and 1930s.257 It seems 
fair to state, however, that anticlassicist legal thinkers of that era were 
generally interested in the relationship between law and custom, broadly 
conceived.   
Moreover, there was a particular strand of realism that focused intensively 
on custom, in a way strikingly reminiscent of Carter.  The preferred term 
among these realists, however, was not custom, but mores. This word choice 
reflected the impact of William Graham Sumner (1840-1910), a tremendously 
popular and influential Professor of Political and Social Science at Yale.258 
Sumner’s most widely-read work, Folkways: A Study of the Sociological 
Importance of Usages, Manners, Customs, Mores, and Morals (1906), 
introduced the term mores into the everyday vocabulary of American 
academia.259 Sumner used the word folkways generally to refer to all naturally 
 
255 At least one scholar has attempted, unsuccessfully, to trace the origins of this 
saying.  See Charles M. Yablon, Justifying the Judge’s Hunch: An Essay on Discretion, 41 
HASTINGS L.J. 231, 236 n. 16 (1990). 
256 Llewellyn, in his 1931 description and defense of the Legal Realism movement, 
stated that the realists agreed “there is less possibility of accurate prediction of what courts 
will do than the traditional rules would lead us to suppose (and what possibility there is 
must be found in good measure outside these same traditional rules).”  But he adamantly 
denied that the realists embraced uncertainty.  He explained, “The immediate result of the 
preliminary work thus far described has been a further, varied series of endeavors; the 
focussing [sic] of conscious attack on discovering the factors thus far unpredictable, in 
good part with a view to their control.” Llewellyn, supra note 243, at 1241-42. 
257 Cf. Thomas C. Grey, Book Review, 106 Yale L.J. 493, 503 (1996) (the realists saw 
adjudication as “intuitive dispute resolution in light of unconsciously absorbed custom.”); 
G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social 
Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999, 1015 (1972) (the 
realists’ view of human behavior as idiosyncratic “was subversive of collective behavior 
standards based on external phenomena. . . .”); and AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 233 
(William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993) (“While most Realists debunked the notion of legal 
doctrine working independently as a motive force in social life, it was only extremists 
among them such as Underhill Moore who considered that legal rules were wholly 
determined by custom or culture, having no gravitational power of their own.”) 
258 See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 53, 55 
(1955); HARRIS E. STARR, WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER 373-82 (1925); Grossman, supra 
note 33, at 376-77. 
259 WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL 
IMPORTANCE OF USAGES, MANNERS, CUSTOMS, MORES, AND MORALS (1940). 
LANGDELL UPSIDE-DOWN 
 
53
evolving, unconsciously followed patterns of behavior within a group.260 
Those folkways with the most directive force over society were, according to 
Sumner, mores, which he defined as “folkways with the connotations of right 
and truth in respect to welfare, embodied in them.”261 Mores were folkways 
“raised to a different plane,” because they were “capable of producing 
inferences, developing into new forms, and extending their constructive 
influence over men and society.”262 Sumner contended that all laws, indeed all 
societal institutions, were “produced out of mores.”263 Similarly to Carter, he 
asserted, “Legislation . . . has to seek standing ground on the existing mores, 
and it soon becomes apparent that legislation, to be strong, must be consistent 
with the mores.”264 Despite the obvious parallels between Sumner’s work and 
Carter’s, there is no evidence that either scholar directly influenced the 
other.265
Sumner’s impact on legal scholarship became evident in the 1910s, 
particularly in the pages of the Yale Law Journal, which printed a number of 
pieces discussing the relationship between mores and law.  In 1917, for 
example, the Journal published “The Dead Hand of the Common Law,” by 
Yale Law School Professor and legal realist Arthur Corbin.  In this piece, 
Corbin praised common law decision making in language strikingly like 
Carter’s.  
 
A very large part of legislation must always be ex post facto and it is this sort of 
judicial legislation [common law decision making] that gives satisfaction.  In 
spite of occasional outcry, it works. It may sometimes be difficult to decide a 
concrete case after it has occurred, but it is far easier than to decide it in 
advance in the form of a general rule.  By this process we get better law, law 
more nearly in harmony with prevailing custom and desire and with the justice 
of the present day.  A litigant is less likely to be surprised and pained by a 
decision based upon rules thus established than he is by decisions based on 
statutes.  Judicial rules, in new cases as well as in old cases, are drawn from the 
mores of society as the judges know them; and they are stated anew in each 
case with specific reference to a case the facts of which are historically 
 
260 Id. at 2-3. 
261 Id. at 38. 
262 Id. at 30. 
263 Id. at 53.  For Sumner’s discussion of the relationship between mores and law, see 
id. at 53-57. 
264 Id. at 55.   
265 Sumner almost certainly cannot have inspired Carter, for FOLKWAYS, the first piece 
in which Sumner articulated his theories in a manner similar to Carter, was not published 
until the year after Carter’s death.  It also seems unlikely that Carter’s work inspired 
Sumner; FOLKWAYS does not include a single citation to Carter’s work.  M. J. Aronson 
ascribed the similarity between the ideas of Carter and Sumner to the fact that each 
represented “the culmination of a current of thought which permeated the intellectual life of 
the last quarter of the nineteenth century”—the “naturalistic evolutionism” of Charles 
Darwin and Herbert Spencer.  M. J. Aronson, The Juridicial Evolutionism of James 
Coolidge Carter, 10 U. TORONTO L. J. 1, 1 (1953).   
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complete.  The litigant will not be greatly surprised at the mores, because his 
daily life is ordered by them and he has helped, generally unconsciously, to 
make them.266 
The subsequent volume of the Yale Law Journal included an article by 
Sumner’s disciple, A.G. Keller, analyzing how law “is a sort of crystallization 
of the mores.”267
Sumner’s influence on the legal academy became especially manifest in 
1919, when the editors of the Yale Law Journal placed an unsigned note titled 
“Social Mores, Legal Analysis, and the Journal” at the start of an issue.  In this 
note, the editors remarked that the Journal, under the inspiration of the late 
Yale Law School Professor Wesley Hohfeld, had recently been concentrating 
on the classification of legal concepts and on “the necessity of a more exact 
terminology leading to a more accurate legal analysis.”268 Now was the time, 
the editors suggested, to shift the Journal’s attention to another critical matter: 
the fact that “law forms but a part of our ever-changing social mores, and that 
it is the function of lawyers, of jurists, and of law schools to cause the 
statement and the application of our legal rules to be in harmony with the 
mores of the present instead of those of an outgrown past.”269 The editors 
acknowledged that Hohfeld’s conceptions were indispensable to the creation 
of any restatement or reclassification of the law, but they continued: “[W]e 
must realize and confess that no restatement or classification is final.  If our 
ancestors supposed ‘justice’ to be eternal and ‘law’ to be a series of 
unchangeable a priori rules from which decisions of all special cases could be 
deduced, so also they supposed the world to be flat and to be the fixed center 
about which the firmament revolved.”270 
The Journal’s editors thus considered an examination of the relationship 
between law and mores to be a necessary counterbalance to conceptualism, 
even Hohfeld’s sophisticated (and arguably subversive) version of 
conceptualism.271 The note, quoting Sumner, continued: 
 
[H]istory affords the perspective in which we can observe that “law” changes 
with the mores of the community and that “the mores can make anything 
right.”  No ingenious arrangement of fundamental legal concepts, no mere 
 
266 Arthur L. Corbin, The Dead Hand of the Common Law, 27 YALE L.J. 668, 672 
(1918).  
267 A. G. Keller, Law in Evolution, 28 YALE L.J. 769, 775 (1919).  See also John E. 
Young, The Law as and Expression of Community Ideals and the Lawmaking Functions of 
the Courts, 27 YALE L.J. 1 (1917); Arthur L. Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contract, 28 
YALE L.J. 739 (1919) (examining the effect of mores).  
268 Social Mores, Legal Analysis, and the Journal, 29 YALE L.J. 83, 84 (1919).  
269 Id. at 83-84.  It is unclear why the editors did not acknowledge the recent articles in 
the Journal, discussed above, concerning law and mores. 
270 Id. at 85. 
271 For a discussion of Hohfeld’s relationship to progressive legal thought, see 
HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 151-56. 
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machinery or terminology, however exact, can determine for us what the 
existing law is or what we shall make it for the future.  That will be determined, 
now as in the past, by the varying feelings and customs and desires and needs 
of men.  Hence those who state or who administer the law must be wise to the 
mores of their own times, must keep perpetually up to date.272 
The editors closed the note by soliciting submissions “making use of the new 
analysis and showing an understanding of the connection of the mores and the 
law, the mores of marriage and the family, the mores of production and 
business, the mores of organized human society.”273
Although the topic of mores can hardly be said to have dominated the Yale 
Law Journal in the years following this call for papers, its pages (as well as 
those of other law reviews) were peppered with references to mores, folkways, 
Sumner, and Keller during the 1920s and 1930s.274 Throughout this period, 
Corbin remained the leading voice in the legal academy on the subject of 
mores.  He played an instrumental role in training, hiring, nurturing, and 
inspiring the second generation of realists, and the concept of mores thus 
inevitably influenced their jurisprudence.275 Corbin, by his own admission, 
did not attempt to support his assertions with empirical data.276 By contrast, 
the later realists strove to support their claims about custom and law with 
varying degrees of investigational rigor.  Corbin sounded more like Carter than 
did any other realist precisely because of the general and nonempirical quality 
of his statements about the relationship between mores and law.   
Nevertheless, discussions of custom evocative of Sumner’s and Carter’s 
work can also be found in the writing of the second-generation realists.  For 
example, Max Radin observed: “The court can select the precedents or the 
interpretation of a statute which will lead to a result in accordance with the 
manners and customs of the people, and the court very commonly does so. . . .  
And it must not be forgotten that judges also are people and, to a considerable 
extent, the court’s own feeling of justice is adequately met if its decisions 
create a situation in accord with the manners and customs of the people.”277 
272 Social Mores, supra note 268, at 85.  
273 Id. The editors’ note cited Carter’s LAW: ITS ORIGIN, GROWTH, AND FUNCTION, but 
only for a point regarding the supposed ex post facto quality of judicial decision making.  
Id. at 85, n. 5. 
274 I confirmed this point by using the database HeinOnline to perform a search of these 
terms in the YALE LAW JOURNAL and other legal periodicals.  
275 For a discussion of Corbin’s role in building Yale into the premier realist law 
school, see KALMAN, supra note 238, at 98-107.  Kalman repeatedly refers to “first 
generation realists” and “second generation realists.” 
276 Arthur L. Corbin, Recent Developments in the Law of Contracts, 50 HARV. L. REV.
449, 472 (1937). 
277 MAX RADIN, THE LAW AND MR. SMITH 34 (1938).  See also Max Radin, The Theory 
of Judicial Decisions: Or How Judges Think, 11 A.B.A. J. 357, 362 (1925) (“We need not 
fear arbitrariness.  Our Cokes and Mansfields and Eldons derive their physical and spiritual 
nourishment from the same sources that we do.  They will find good what we find good, if 
we will let them.”). 
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Karl Llewellyn asserted that “law observance is a question not of legal rules, 
but of the formation of folkways that can be and will be learned chiefly 
without direct reference to particular rules.”278 He described how the realists 
studied the “set-up of men’s ways and practices and ideas on the subject 
matter of the controversy . . . , in the hope that this might yield a further or 
even final basis for prediction.”279 Llewellyn included, in this type of 
scholarship, not only the painstaking empirical studies of societal practices by 
his contemporaries, but also the “more or less indefinite reference to custom 
[by] the historical school.”280 
The realists’ approach to custom was less simplistic than Carter’s.  
Llewellyn, for example, criticized “the vast vagueness of Carter’s picture,” 
pointing to his failure adequately to address the “multiformity and conflict of 
subgroup ‘customs,’” and situations in which officials created law in the 
absence of custom, or even in contradiction to it.281 Nonetheless, the realists’ 
parallel turn to custom reflected a similar impulse to identify objective, 
“scientific” bases for judicial decisions apart from formalistic legal reasoning.  
Both Carter and the realists portrayed the study of law as an empirical, value-
free enterprise.  Llewellyn famously declared that a common characteristic of 
realist scholarship was “the temporary divorce of Is and Ought for purposes of 
study. . . .  This involves during the study of what courts are doing the effort to 
disregard the question what they ought to do.”282 Carter had used almost 
exactly the same language a quarter century earlier: “I have sought to discover 
those rules only which actually regulate conduct, not those which ought to 
regulate it.  Science asks primarily only what is, not what ought to be.”283 
C.  Codification and Restatement 
 
The parallels between Carter and the legal realists are perhaps most evident 
when one examines realist discussions of codification.  With respect to this 
subject, it is interesting to start with Oliver Wendell Holmes.  The very first 
 
278 Karl N. Llewellyn, Law Observance Versus Law Enforcement, in JURISPRUDENCE:
REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 399 (1962).  Llewellyn originally delivered this address 
in 1928. 
279 Llewellyn, supra note 243, at 1244. 
280 Id.
281 Llewellyn, Carter, supra note 112. 
282 Llewellyn, supra note 243, at 1236.  For the leading account of the battle between 
the realists and their critics over the question of ethics and values, see EDWARD A. PURCELL,
JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 159-78 (1973).  Morton Horwitz argues that 
historians, by narrowly defining the Legal Realist movement to include primarily social-
science-oriented scholars of the 1920s and 1930s, have understated Realism’s ethical 
concerns and political commitments.  HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 169-92.  Horwitz’s 
argument depends mostly on expanding the list of “realists,” however; he does not really 
demonstrate (or even try to demonstrate) that the scholars traditionally identified as realists 
prioritized questions of ethics and values. 
283 CARTER, ORIGIN, GROWTH & FUNCTION, supra note 40, at 145. 
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scholarly article Holmes ever published was titled Codes, and the 
Arrangement of the Law. It appeared in 1870 in the American Law Review 
and was reprinted by the Harvard Law Review in 1931, during the heyday of 
the Legal Realist movement.284 Despite the article’s early date, it is 
worthwhile to consider it in this context, because Holmes was such a powerful 
influence on the realists of the 1920s and 1930s.285 
Holmes, a transitional figure, did not altogether deny the value of 
conceptual ordering.  Although he denied that general principles decided 
concrete cases, he acknowledged that such principles (in Thomas Grey’s 
words) “focused attention on the competing considerations relevant to the 
decision, providing guidance by confining the range of argument.”286 Thus, in 
Codes, and the Arrangement of Law, Holmes remarked that a “well-arranged” 
and “connected” statement of “the whole body of the law” would be a valuable 
thing. 
 
The importance of it, if it could be obtained, cannot be overrated.  In the first 
place it points out at once the leading analogy between groups. . . .  The perfect 
lawyer is he who commands all ties between a given case and all others.  But 
few lawyers are perfect, and all have to learn their business.  A well-arranged 
body of the law would not only train the mind of the student to a sound legal 
habit of thought, but would remove obstacles from his path which he now only 
overcomes after years of experience and reflection.287 
Because a single author might not have the capacity to prepare an entire 
“philosophically arranged corpus juris,” Holmes suggested that the task be 
assigned to a group of scholars working for the government.288 He opposed 
giving the work of these public employees the status of legislation, however; 
he favored some sort of unenacted treatise rather than a true code.  Holmes 
justified this position as follows: 
 
New cases will arise which will elude the most carefully constructed formula.  
The common law, proceeding, as we have pointed out, by a series of successive 
approximations—by a continual reconciliation of cases—is prepared for this, 
and simply modifies the form of its rule.  But what will the court do with a 
code?  If the code is truly law, the court is confined to a verbal construction of 
the rule as expressed, and must decide the case wrong.  If the court, on the 
other hand, is at liberty to . . . take into account that the code is only intended to 
 
284 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 44 HARV. L. REV.
725 (1931) (previously published in 5 AM. L. REV. 1 (1870)).  The Harvard Law Review 
reprinted this article as part of a collection of four Early Writings of O. W. Holmes, Jr., with 
an introduction by Felix Frankfurter.  Frankfurter noted that the essays “pose juristic issues 
still, or, more accurately, again in controversy.”  Id. at 720. 
285 See Fisher, supra note 257, at 3 (discussing the realists’ celebration of Holmes and 
frequent citations to his works).    
286 Grey, supra note 4, at 44. 
287 Holmes, supra note 284, at 727. 
288 Id. at 726-27. 
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declare the judicial rule, and has done so defectively, and may then go on and 
supply the defect, . . . the code is not law, but a mere text-book recommended 
by the government as containing all at present known on the subject.289 
Holmes recognized that logic sometimes clashed with good sense when it 
came to the resolution of specific matters, and he thought courts should favor 
the latter on such occasions.  “Law is not a science, but is essentially 
empirical.  Hence, although the general arrangement should be philosophical 
. . . compromises with practical convenience are highly proper.”290 
Holmes’s position on codification was thus very like Carter’s.  Both men, 
for the same reasons, opposed the enactment of a code with the force of a 
statute, but they both also recognized the merit of a well-arranged statement of 
the common law.  Carter similarly remarked that a “book containing a 
statement in the manner of a Digest, and in analytical and systematic form of 
the whole unwritten law, expressed in accurate, scientific language, is indeed a 
thing which the legal profession has yearned after. . .  It would refresh the 
failing memory, reproduce in the mind of its forgotten acquisitions, exhibit the 
body of the law, so as to enable a view to be had of the whole, and of the 
relation of the several parts.”291 In the final analysis, however, Carter 
probably assigned less value to logically arranged principles than did 
Holmes—particularly the young Holmes.  
When the realists addressed the issue of codification decades later, there 
was little, if any, call for the adoption of a complete code and the abandonment 
of the common law method.  The energy of the codification movement had 
splintered into an occasionally successful push for uniform state laws in 
discrete areas, on the one hand, and the American Law Institute’s scheme to 
produce an unenacted but authoritative Restatement of the common law, on 
the other.  Consequently, the realists had little to say about the wisdom of true 
codification.  Nevertheless, at least one major realist directly critiqued the 
notion of a European-style code.  In his influential book, Law and the Modern 
Mind, Jerome Frank attacked the premises of complete codification in a 
manner that highlights the similarities between legal realism and Carter’s 
jurisprudence.  
In Frank’s eyes, codification in its pure form was simply another variety of 
the “legal fundamentalism” championed by the Langdellians.292 He mocked 
those jurists, throughout history, who had contended, in his words: “Let us end 
all this confusion by adopting a code.  Let us once and for all by statute enact a 
carefully prepared body of rules sufficiently complete to settle all future 
controversies.”293 Frank observed that in each such instance, from Frederick 
 
289 Id. at 726. 
290 Id. at 728. 
291 CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 39, at 96-97.  
292 JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 53 (1970) (originally published 1930) 
(Chapter VI titled “Beale, and Legal Fundamentalism”). 
293 Id. at 200. 
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the Great’s Prussia to Napoleon’s France to modern Germany, “the hope of 
attaining a large measure of legal certainty by codification proved vain.  It 
produced not certainty, but sterile logic-chopping.”294 Frank continued: 
 
Where code-worship has prevailed in code-governed countries, the real judicial 
process of adaptation has been concealed under the guise of formal exactness. 
. . . In attempts to achieve a perfect code covering all imaginable cases, we 
encounter again the old dream of legal finality and exactitude.  Once this dream 
took the form of a belief in a list of rules directly God-derived.  Belief in a 
man-made code, which shall be exhaustive and final, is essentially the same 
dream in another form, but a form which hides from superficial study the 
nature of the dream.  But a dream it is, nevertheless.  For only a dream-code 
can anticipate all possible legal disputes and regulate them in advance.295 
Frank’s psychoanalytical terminology and scornful attitude toward religion 
(qualities that pervaded his book) would have been foreign to Carter.  But 
Carter would have wholly agreed with Frank’s assertion that codes are 
invariably flawed because “no one can foresee all future combinations of 
events. . . .  Situations are bound to occur which the legislature never 
contemplated when enacting the statutes.”296 
Carter also would have concurred with Frank’s contention that “the attempt 
to have the courts apply statutes as if indeed they were all-sufficient . . .  leads 
to no small measure of uncertainty.”297 Carter maintained that judges, in their 
efforts to make statutes produce fair outcomes, used “subtle arts of 
interpretation” that heightened uncertainty.298 Frank similarly explained: 
 
Except in those cases which happen to be explicitly covered by the code, 
the judicial interpreter takes out of the code provisions exactly what he puts in.  
In spite of, or perhaps more accurately, because of, this false appearance of 
purely logical interpretation, the decisions become unpredictable.  For where 
the code is silent, the conventional theory of so-called “interpretation” requires 
the judge to decide cases by analogy to some code rule, and the selection of the 
rule thus to be applied by analogy involves, of course, the exercise of a flexible 
discretion to a far larger extent than is acknowledged by the exponents of the 
theory or by the judges who believe that they are adhering to the theory.299 
294 Id. at 203. 
295 Id. at 203-04. 
296 Id. at 204. 
297 Id. at 205. 
298 CARTER, PROPOSED CODIFICATION, supra note 39, at 37-38. 
299 FRANK, supra note 292, at 205-06.  Interestingly, Frank did not categorically reject 
all codification.  In an appendix to his book, he remarked that “a code deliberately devised 
with reference to the desirability of growth and stated in terms of general guiding and 
flexible principles may some day prove to be the way out of some of the difficulties of legal 
administration in America.”  Id. at 337.  
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In stark contrast to Carter, Frank adamantly insisted that judges “made” 
law.  He did not mention Carter in Law and the Modern Mind, but he surely 
would have dismissed Carter’s customary theory as simply another example of 
a “childish” belief in predetermined law.300 Nevertheless, there is surprising 
overlap in the work of the two scholars; Carter anticipated by almost fifty 
years Frank’s analysis of the consequences of applying general code 
provisions to particular cases. 
As noted above, by the legal realists’ time, there was no serious effort to 
adopt a system of complete codification in the United States.  During the last 
years of the nineteenth century, as it became clear that Field’s campaign to 
codify the entire common law would fail, scholars and practitioners interested 
in codification had turned their attention to establishing uniform codes in 
particular substantive areas for adoption by the states.  This effort remained 
very much alive in the 1920s and 1930s.  Indeed, the legal realist Karl 
Llewellyn became one of the leading figures in this second-wave codification 
movement. 
The American Bar Association (ABA) hatched the uniform code 
movement in the early 1890s, as Field’s campaign for his Civil Code, and 
Field himself, were breathing their last.301 The National Conference of the 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), which the ABA helped 
establish, met for the first time in 1892.  By the 1930s, the commissioners had 
produced uniform acts in a variety of discrete commercial subjects, some of 
which had been adopted by a majority of the states.302 
In the late 1930s, Llewellyn started planning what would become the 
uniform code movement’s greatest triumph: the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC).  The NCCUSL and the American Law Institute jointly drafted and 
revised the UCC during the 1940s and 1950s, and every state but Louisiana 
eventually adopted it.  Although many scholars and lawyers worked on the 
UCC, Llewellyn, the chief reporter for the code, was indisputably the 
individual with the greatest influence over it.303 It reflected his realist ideals in 
various ways.304 
The fact that Llewellyn dedicated much of his career to preparing and 
promoting a code does not, as one might suppose, reflect an important 
distinction between the realists and Carter.  Llewellyn, like Jerome Frank, 
 
300 Id. at 204, 207.  Frank praised John Dickinson’s criticism of the “early 19th Century 
theory that the ‘law behind the law’ was located in popular custom.”  Id. at 283-84. 
301 Field died in 1894. 
302 For the history of the NCCUSL, see WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE 
REALIST MOVEMENT 272-73 (1973); James J. White, Ex Proprio Vigore, 89 MICH. L. REV.
2096, 2097-2105 (1991). 
303 See TWINING, supra note 302, at 270-340 (assessing the extent of Llewellyn’s 
influence over the UCC). 
304 See id. at 302-340; Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621 (1975); Zipporah B. Wiseman, The 
Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1987). 
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unambiguously rejected the idea of a continental-style code providing for 
every case within its scope.305 Indeed, in his 1931 encyclopedia article on 
Carter, Llewellyn wholly sympathized with his subject’s condemnation of 
complete codification.  He agreed that Field’s Civil Code was “ill considered.”  
Nevertheless, in the article, Llewellyn suggested that codification, properly 
done, would not necessarily conflict with realist principles.  He remarked, 
“[Carter’s] argument attacks not codification as it is—a fresh and fertile start 
for case law, which at its best already incorporates existing tendencies—but 
the utopian ideal of the blinder advocates of codification: a closed system, 
‘certain’—and dead.”306 
Interestingly, some of the same impulses that drove Carter’s battle against 
Field’s Civil Code also motivated Llewellyn’s work in support of the Uniform 
Commercial Code.  As Richard Danzig argues with respect to Article II of the 
UCC, “[T]he animating principle behind [Llewellyn’s] theories and this 
legislative achievement is, paradoxically, . . . a renunciation of legislative 
responsibility and power.”307 Like Carter, Llewellyn preferred a flexible, 
contextual, court-centered decisional process.  He thus did not intend the UCC 
to provide a resolution for every case in advance.  Danzig observes: “Whereas 
a code functioned for such diverse thinkers as Frederick the Great, Austin, or 
Williston as a means of dictating a result, Llewellyn’s UCC Article II more 
often operated as a means of dictating a method.  That method was designed to 
prompt decision not according to the letter or the logic of a statute or a juristic 
concept but rather according to the “situation-reason.”308 
If the UCC had appeared during his lifetime, Carter might well have 
acknowledged that it was a noble effort, so far as any code could be noble.  
Carter was a champion of the common law, and the UCC was, in the words of 
one scholar, “drafted in the expectation that it would be interpreted by 
common law trained lawyers and judges.”309 The UCC explicitly incorporates 
the principles of common law and equity unless they are “displaced” by 
particular code provisions.310 Moreover, it repeatedly directs courts to 
consider what would be “reasonable” under the circumstances.311 And Carter 
would certainly have approved of the fact that the UCC makes “usage of 
trade” a presumed component of commercial agreements.312 Ultimately, 
however, it is impossible to know how Carter would have responded to an 
open-ended code like the UCC, for although he might have admired certain 
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features of the instrument, he likely would have been hesitant to compromise 
his anticodification stance. 
It is also unclear how Carter would have responded to the American Law 
Institute’s Restatement project.  The ALI, founded in 1923, was (and remains) 
an organization composed of law professors, judges, and practicing lawyers 
dedicated to the “improvement of law.”313 As noted above, it cooperated with 
the NCCUSL in the preparation of the Uniform Commercial Code.  However, 
its primary mission, at the time of its formation, was to prepare a 
comprehensive Restatement of the common law.  By 1944, the ALI had 
produced what it believed to be an authoritative Restatement of the law in each 
of ten subject areas.314 
Like David Dudley Field, the proponents of the Restatement project hoped 
to alleviate the problems of legal uncertainty and complexity by setting forth 
the fundamental principles of the common law in a logically ordered form.  
Despite the similar motives behind codification and the Restatements, 
however, Carter’s opposition to the former does not necessarily imply that he 
would have resisted the latter.  Indeed, Carter seemed to declare his support 
for something like a Restatement, remarking, “A statement of the whole body 
of the law in scientific language, and in a concise and systematic form . . . 
would be of priceless value.”315 
In considering how Carter would have responded to the ALI Restatement 
project, it is important to keep in mind a critical difference between Field’s 
Civil Code and the Restatements: the ALI never intended for the latter to be 
enacted into law.316 Indeed, the institute rejected the statutory path for reasons 
that closely paralleled Carter’s anticodification arguments.  As Nathan Crystal 
has observed, the ALI worried that if the Restatements were enacted, “the 
flexibility of the common law would be lost, . . . courts would be bound 
simply to follow the statute and ‘injustice would result in many cases 
presenting unforeseen facts.’”317 Perhaps Carter would have endorsed the 
Restatements so long as they remained unenacted and thus avoided these 
problems. 
Then again, Carter might have opposed the Restatements in the form they 
actually assumed.  His response might have been similar to that of the legal 
realists, who initially viewed the ALI’s project as a useful effort to ease legal 
uncertainty, but whose “alienation . . . was complete” by the time the final 
versions were published.318 Although the ALI did not pursue legislative 
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enactment, it inherited the assumption of many code advocates that legal 
doctrines could be abstracted away from their factual contexts.319 As G. 
Edward White has observed, the realists ultimately rejected the Restatement’s 
embrace of taxonomic logic and the “coherence and relevance of the legal 
rules themselves.”320 Realist Hessel E. Yntema remarked, “[M]ost of the data 
to which attention should be given in a responsible formulation of law have to 
be excluded in the preparation of the Restatement—data as to the practical 
needs to be met and as to the appropriateness of the means of regulation 
employed to meet them.”321 Criticizing the Restatement’s character as a 
“statement of the general principles of the common law, not dissimilar to the 
European codes,” Yntema observed, “It is something of an irony that Carter’s 
argument [that a good digest of the law would be of ‘priceless value’] is 
employed to support a Restatement of the Law which has a purpose and many 
of the characters which he opposed.” 322 
IX. CONCLUSION: PRACTITIONERS’ JURISPRUDENCE?
Carter’s jurisprudence, as well as that of his anticodification allies Albert 
Mathews and R. Floyd Clarke, was probably shaped in part by their experience 
as practicing lawyers.  Because litigators unavoidably tend to focus on the 
facts of particular cases and on the flexibility of legal rules, there is tension 
between litigation practice, on the one hand, and the conceptual formalism 
embodied by complete codification and Langdellian classicism, on the other.  
Although Carter took obvious pride in his own erudition, there is an anti-
intellectual undercurrent to his writing, directed at those who devoted their 
lives entirely to affairs of the mind.  He described supporters of codification in 
terms similar to those he used to characterize Langdell.323 Jeremy Bentham 
was “a man of pre-eminent intellectual ability, but not an experienced lawyer, 
or a safe guide upon any subject.”324 The codifiers’ calls for more systematic 
order were “the views of professors of law, whose lives are devoted, not like 
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those of lawyers and judges, to the practical administration of law, but to 
teaching it, and lecturing about it.”325 
Perhaps the daily representation of clients in actual matters led Carter and 
other practitioners to focus on fine factual distinctions more than on abstract 
principles.  In a speech to graduating law students at Columbian University 
(now George Washington University), Carter offered advice on “how to direct 
your attention when you come to engage in the practical work of the lawyer.”  
He told the students: 
 
Inasmuch as your science consists in the observation of facts with which it 
deals, and those facts are the transactions of men, you cannot study them too 
closely.  You will often find, what every practicing lawyer has found, that 
much of the difficulty and uncertainty you meet with in the study of any 
particular case does not come, as one is apt to think, from ignorance of the law, 
but from a too hasty and insufficient observation of the facts . . . .  It has often 
happened to me that clients would come to me with cases in respect to which 
they would have an undoubting conviction that the right was on their side, an 
opinion I was not able at first to confirm, but, upon subsequent reflection, I 
would become converted to their views.  The reason was that I would be 
thinking upon the abstract rules of law instead of closely studying the facts, 
while they, living and moving in the facts and in the customs and usages which 
men observe, really possessed views of the law clearer and juster than my 
own.326 
Carter’s practice experience may also have instilled in him a belief in the 
contingency and manipulability of legal reasoning.  In the same speech, Carter 
remarked: “The lawyer is not charged in any case with the duty of finally 
determining which side is right, but of finding grounds and reasons for 
defending the side upon which he is retained. . . .  Lawsuits are not conflicts in 
which all arguments upon the one side are right and upon the other wrong; 
they are conflicts between rival and competing rules and principles, all of 
which are true within certain limits but some of which must give way to the 
superior force of others.”327 Although Carter never abandoned his conviction 
that there was, in fact, a correct answer to every case, he attributed the law’s 
determinacy not to the legal reasoning process, but to the social standard of 
justice on which the law was based.  
Clarke, like Carter, suggested that his anticodification stance, and his 
anticonceptualism generally, derived from insight he acquired as a practicing 
lawyer. 
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 No amount of theory is equivalent to actual practice; and in generalizing 
on a subject without actual contact with the things themselves, we are apt to 
lose sight of facts, and be misled by false analogies.  In reading the theoretical 
jurists, a practical lawyer receives the impression that had Bentham, Austin, 
and some others, ever taken an active part in the actual practice of law . . . they 
would have preferred as a practical guide the incoherent mass of material 
preserved in our common law reports to the most scientific code that the human 
mind could possible produce. 
 The philosopher in his closet, viewing all things by the dry light of 
generalization, naturally loses sight of the individual cases, and the difficulties 
inherent in their true solution.  His only problem is to generalize these cases 
into some order and coherence. . . . 
 The practitioner, on the other hand, looks only at the problem of the 
special case presented.  His difficulty is to find light to guide him to a correct 
decision of the case in hand. . . .328 
This is not to say that Gilded Age practitioners unanimously opposed 
codification.  After all, David Dudley Field himself was an active attorney.  
Moreover, at its 1886 annual meeting, the American Bar Association, by a 
vote of 58 to 41, adopted the following resolution offered by Field: “The law 
itself should be reduced, so far as its substantive principles are settled, to the 
form of a statute.”329 
Nevertheless, in considering the attitudes of practicing lawyers toward 
codification, it is important to define carefully what is meant by the term 
codification. Clarke, like Carter, railed against a complete code that 
“professes to, and is intended to, state all the rules that may be applicable to 
that province of the law of which it is a Code.”330 The lawyers attending the 
1886 ABA meeting were not opining on such an instrument.  Field, in his 
comments preceding the vote, emphasized the limited significance of his 
resolution.  He stressed that a vote for the resolution did not represent support 
for general codification, but merely for the position that principles of law 
should be stated in statutory form when it was feasible to do so.331 And 
although he remarked that he personally supported the adoption of a code, he 
emphasized that he did “not mean by it a book which shall contain within its 
covers all the rules of law which are to govern all the transactions of men in all 
future time.”332 In short, the ABA’s approval of Field’s resolution cannot be 
interpreted as anything like an endorsement of European-style complete 
codification.  
Supporters of codification viewed the practicing bar not only as a barrier to 
enacting a code, but also as a primary cause of the legal uncertainty and 
disorder they were striving to alleviate in the first place.  The Albany Law 
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Journal, in an article supporting codification, thus asserted that lawyers should 
not be involved in drafting the code.  The article maintained that the practicing 
lawyer 
 
has been, as it were, counting the bricks in every case he argued before a bench 
or jury, instead of considering the philosophy and higher analogies of the legal 
principles involved. . . .  Arguments of particular points, even of law and not of 
fact, are arguments on facts, and not on the expansiveness of laws or of their 
natural relations to one another, but only on their relation to facts. . . .  The 
facts in each case admit of no deduction.  It is only the law involved in these 
facts that admits of such ratiocinative development.  . . .  [The practicing 
lawyer’s] functions . . . savor too much of the concrete to foster a philosophic 
spirit. . . .  His eloquence, poetry, imagination, rhetoric and philosophy, all have 
a point that are [sic] fit only for lodgment in earth, and not for the broad basis 
of philosophical structures.333 
Interestingly, the practitioner’s mentality is another thing Carter shared 
with the legal realists.  Although the realists’ level of practice experience 
varied greatly,334 it is probably fair to say that most of them, inspired by Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’s pragmatic and predictive “bad man” theory of the law,335 
manifested a practice-oriented ethos to at least some extent. 
In 1933, Jerome Frank, who had the most practice experience of the 
leading realists, expressly championed the practitioner’s perspective—or at 
least what he thought should be the practitioner’s perspective.  In his article 
Why Not a Clinical Law School?, Frank asserted that law schools should hire 
experienced attorneys as professors and should reform legal education to “get 
in intimate contact with what clients need and with what courts and lawyers 
actually do.”336 He disparaged Langdell’s case method as the invention of a 
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pathetic, isolated man with “an obsessive and almost exclusive interest in 
books.”337 Many years earlier, Carter had similarly, though more gently, 
criticized the Harvard case method’s exclusive reliance on law books, 
remarking that “[t]hese volumes [of reported cases] . . .  are but a part of the 
great territory of fact which it is the business of the lawyer and jurist to 
explore.”338 
Just as Carter had scoffed at the “so-called rules found in our digests and 
treatises and mentioned in the reports of decided cases,”339 Frank derided the 
“so-called legal rules and principles” on which law professors focused.340 In 
Frank’s view, this excessive attention to rules and principles left students ill-
prepared for practice. 
 
Now no sane person will deny that a knowledge of those rules and principles 
. . . is part of the indispensable equipment of the future lawyer.  For such 
knowledge is of some limited aid in guessing what courts will do. . . .  But the 
tasks of the lawyer do not pivot around those rules and principles.  The work of 
the lawyer revolves about specific decisions in definite pieces of litigation. . . .  
What the courts will decide in specific cases involving the rights of specific 
clients under specific acts, documents, or transactions must, therefore, be the 
center of the lawyer’s thinking.341 
Frank, like Carter, considered conceptual formalism to be an impractical 
fantasy of detached academicians. 
As Frank himself recognized, there is no inevitable correlation between 
litigation experience and a resistance to formal conceptualism.342 But in 
examining the history of American legal thought, it is useful to consider the 
possibility that the jurisprudence of practicing lawyers (and of law professors 
with a practice background) has been shaped by that practical experience.  
Although practicing lawyers do not usually think of themselves as 
jurisprudential thinkers, they inevitably develop jurisprudential notions.  They 
do not frequently articulate these broad legal theories, even to themselves.  At 
times, however, a controversy arises in the world of legal practice that requires 
members of the bar systematically to analyze the overall nature of the system 
within which they work.  The codification dispute of the late nineteenth 
century was such a moment.  
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